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ABSTRACT 
The Philadelphia Police Department currently has no policy providing guidance to 
its police officers on how to safely and humanely enact the quarantine enforcement 
component of the Isolation and Quarantine Plan developed by the Philadelphia 
Department of Public Health. Thus, this thesis addresses the question: How can a humane 
quarantine policy be enforced by the Philadelphia Police Department to stop the spread of 
communicable infectious diseases? To answer the question, a Likert Scale was employed 
to rank the efficacy of quarantine enforcement: effectiveness, community support, cost, 
and implementation ease. The research indicates forced quarantine cannot be 
implemented successfully without evidence-based practices to support it. The use of 
self-quarantine benefits from providing essential services to quarantined citizens and the 
powers of arrest should only be used after reasonable enforcement means have been 
attempted. Hybrid quarantine plans tailored to the disease and enacted with sound 
medical advice are best suited to stop disease spread. U.S. law enforcement agencies 
would benefit from developing a quarantine enforcement plan and updating 
existing public health quarantine plans to include additional guidance for officers along 
these lines. A collaborative plan must be established among all stakeholders to 
deliver essential goods and information. 
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The Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) currently has no policy providing 
guidance to its police officers on how to enact the quarantine enforcement component of 
the Isolation and Quarantine Plan (IQP) developed by the Philadelphia Department of 
Public Health (PDPH). Quarantine restricts the movement of healthy people who may have 
been exposed to a contagious patient infected with a communicable disease.1 The use of 
quarantine has successfully stopped the spread of disease to otherwise healthy people in 
the community.2 Enforcing a successful quarantine plan may be the only method available 
to stop the spread of life-threatening communicable diseases. This thesis examines how a 
quarantine policy can be enforced by the PPD to stop the spread of communicable 
infectious diseases. 
This thesis explores the enforcement of quarantine orders during communicable 
disease events between 1976 and 2018. The 2019 Novel Coronavirus pandemic had begun 
as this thesis was completed and is not included.3 The quarantine enforcement policies 
include forced quarantine, self-quarantine, and hybrid quarantine plans. Quarantine 
enforcement was used during the 2003 outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome in 
Canada, in response to the 2014 Ebola virus disease scare in the United States, and with 
the 2009 H1N1 epidemic in China, among others.4 Therefore, based on these findings, this 
thesis addresses how the Philadelphia Police Department, along with other member 
agencies and community stakeholders, can quarantine people during communicable 
 
1 Division Digital Communications, “What Is the Difference between Isolation and Quarantine?” U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services, June 7, 2015, https://www.hhs.gov/answers/public-health-and-
safety/what-is-the-difference-between-isolation-and-quarantine/index.html. 
2 “Quarantine and Isolation,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, April 23, 2019, 
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/index.html. 
3 “2019 Novel Coronavirus,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, February 12, 2020, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html. 
4 Richard Schabas, “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Did Quarantine Help?,” The Canadian 
Journal of Infectious Diseases & Medical Microbiology 15, no. 4 (2004): 204; Polly J. Price, “Quarantine 
and Liability in the Context of Ebola,” Public Health Reports 131, no. 3 (2016): 500–503; Xinhai Li et al., 
“Was Mandatory Quarantine Necessary in China for Controlling the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic?” International 
Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 10, no. 10 (October 2013): 4690–4700, 
https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph10104690. 
xvi 
disease incidents. The research indicates, as case law establishes, that forced quarantine 
cannot be implemented successfully without evidence-based practices to support it. The 
use of self-quarantine benefits from providing essential services to quarantined citizens and 
the powers of arrest should only be used after reasonable means have been attempted. 
Hybrid quarantine plans tailored to the disease and enacted with sound medical advice are 
best suited to stop the spread of infectious disease. 
The recommendations of this thesis can contribute to the creation of an effective 
plan for the PPD to enforce quarantine orders especially since the current IQP tasks the 
PPD with implementing quarantine enforcement orders with little guidance. Hopefully, this 
thesis will lead to appropriate changes to the existing IQP concerning the proper 
enforcement of quarantine orders. The collaboration of non-government and government 
agencies can be used to provide affected citizens with food, water, medication, and 
information while acting as a force multiplier to lessen the logistical strain on the PPD.  
The lynchpin of the plan lies in the communication of pertinent medical information 
related to the communicable disease event. To provide timely and accurate information to 
the community, the release of this data should be made available through traditional and 
non-traditional media outlets (on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, etc.), as well as 
prominently displayed on the websites of the PPD, Philadelphia Fire Department, PDPH, 
and the City of Philadelphia. Providing citizens with information concerning an epidemic 
and quarantine plans can assist them in maintaining quarantine compliance and stopping 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) currently has no policy providing 
guidance to its police officers on how to enact the quarantine enforcement component of 
the Isolation and Quarantine Plan (IQP) developed by the Philadelphia Department of 
Public Health (PDPH) safely and humanely. Quarantine restricts the movement of healthy 
people who may have been exposed to a contagious patient infected with a communicable 
disease.1 The use of quarantine has successfully stopped the spread of disease to otherwise 
healthy people in the community.2 Thus, Philadelphia details both measures in its IQP. 
Enforcing a successful quarantine and isolation plan may be the only method available to 
stop the spread of life-threatening communicable diseases. 
Without guidelines on the implementation of either isolation or quarantine, the IQP 
cannot be enforced effectively and can cause undue harm to the people affected by 
communicable diseases in Philadelphia. Accordingly, in 2018, the PDPH updated the IQP 
in response to past communicable disease pandemics, including the severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in Toronto during 2003 and the 2014–2016 Ebola 
virus disease (EVD) that started in West Africa. Both pandemics caused fear and hysteria 
worldwide, and as a result, numerous city and state governments in the United States 
implemented policies with mixed results. Quarantine enforcement has been used during 
such events as the 2003 outbreaks of SARS in Canada, in response to the 2014 EVD scare 
 
1 Division Digital Communications, “What Is the Difference between Isolation and Quarantine?” U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services, June 7, 2015, https://www.hhs.gov/answers/public-health-and-
safety/what-is-the-difference-between-isolation-and-quarantine/index.html. 
2 “Quarantine and Isolation,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, April 23, 2019, 
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/index.html. 
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in the United States, and for the 2009 H1N1 epidemic in China.3 The use of quarantine 
enforcement during these episodes had varying degrees of success. Therefore, this thesis 
addresses how the PPD, along with other member agencies and community stakeholders, 
can safely and humanely quarantine and isolate people during communicable disease 
incidents. 
The IQP outlines the legal steps to be taken if a person suspected of being infected 
with a contagious communicable disease needs to be placed under quarantine or isolation. 
The IQP states that a PDPH representative will appear before the Presiding Judge of the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and seek a court order against the person to be 
quarantined.4 The Pennsylvania Disease Prevention and Control Law of 1955 states an 
individual may be quarantined to protect the public “in such a manner as to prevent 
effective contact with those not exposed.”5 The PPD will enforce this order and the patient 
will be charged with a summary offense if non-compliant.6 
PPD leaders realized incarcerating offenders for any type of summary offenses 
caused undue liability issues and found it to be unnecessary. The citation policy was 
changed, and people previously arrested for summary offenses now receive a summary 
citation from a PPD officer at the scene of the incident and are released unless “exceptional 
circumstances” warrant an arrest.7 
 
3 Richard Schabas, “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Did Quarantine Help?” The Canadian 
Journal of Infectious Diseases & Medical Microbiology 15, no. 4 (2004): 204, 
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/cjidmm/2004/521892.pdf; Polly J. Price, “Quarantine and Liability 
in the Context of Ebola,” Public Health Reports 131, no. 3 (2016): 500; 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4869076/pdf/phr131000500a.pdf; Xinhai Li et al., “Was 
Mandatory Quarantine Necessary in China for Controlling the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic?” International 
Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 10, no. 10 (October 2013): 4690, 
https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph10104690.  
4 Philadelphia Department of Public Health, Isolation and Quarantine Plan (Philadelphia: 
Philadelphia Department of Public Health, 2018), 12.  
5 Disease Prevention and Control Law of 1955, 1956 Pa. Laws, Public Law 1510 (1956): no. 500. 
6 Philadelphia Police Department, Issuance of Non-Traffic Summary Citations/CVNs, Directive 12.10 
(Philadelphia: Philadelphia Police Department, 1, effective December 5, 2016, 
https://www.phillypolice.com/accountability/index.html. 
7 Philadelphia Police Department, 1. 
3 
Enforcing the IQP will likely have legal, social, and medical ramifications that have 
not been adequately addressed by the PDPH or the PPD. Since the enactment of the 
Pennsylvania Disease Prevention and Control Law of 1955, PPD arrest procedures have 
changed dramatically. Solely relying on legislation to decide that ordinary citizens, not 
criminals, may be held against their will because of a violation of the quarantine and 
isolation policy will undoubtedly have deleterious effects. While the IQP developed by the 
City of Philadelphia isolates people who have a contagious communicable disease from 
others, a holistic approach to executing the plan needs to be assessed prior to 
implementation. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can a humane quarantine policy be enforced by the PPD to stop the spread of 
communicable infectious diseases? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review explores available research related to the role of law 
enforcement in a public health emergency to enforce isolation and quarantine policies. This 
literature review also explores the need to balance the rights of individuals against the 
public expectation of being protected against communicable diseases. The third section 
discusses research describing the effectiveness of law enforcement actions during public 
health emergencies.  
1. Role of Law Enforcement in a Public Health Crisis 
The literature is mixed about whether it is appropriate for law enforcement to play 
a role during an epidemic, and if so, what that role should be. Some authors believe that 
law enforcement will and should play a predominant role but ideally will use a 
collaborative approach. For example, Mark A. Rothstein et al. describe in Quarantine and 
Isolation: Lessons Learned from SARS that Canadian law enforcement took on a 
collaborative role during this crisis and did not entirely rely on their powers of arrest and 
detention. Canadian law enforcement worked with members of the department of public 
health, local hospitals, and emergency medical services (EMS) personnel to enforce 
4 
quarantine orders.8 By the same token, Lurie et al. indicate public health officials are not 
as engaged with the public on a daily basis as law enforcement, which may lead to police 
officers playing a critical role in implementing cohesive quarantine enforcement plans.9  
On the opposite side of the debate, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
calls law enforcement the “wrong tool for the job” when it involves quarantine 
enforcement.10 Similarly, in his book, Driven by Fear: Epidemics and Isolation in San 
Francisco’s House of Pestilence, Guenter B. Risse criticizes the past use of quarantine for 
being directed at immigrant groups and poor non-whites blamed for bringing diseases into 
the community.11 In a similar vein, Sam Adler-Bell and Barton Gellman highlight law 
enforcement’s history of focusing on disadvantaged communities and invasion of privacy 
as prohibitive factors that lead to quarantine orders being served unfairly.12 In addition, in 
an article published in The Lancet, Patrick Eba states that after the mass quarantine for 
Ebola was implemented in West Africa, abuses occurred, such as the denial of timely 
medical care, food, and water.13 The literature does not provide a consensus as to the proper 
role of law enforcement in a public health crisis. 
2. Balancing Individual Rights vs. the Needs of the Public  
Tasking law enforcement to enforce quarantine orders raises the issue of balancing 
the rights of the individual against the interests of maintaining the community’s health by 
 
8 Mark A. Rothstein et al., Quarantine and Isolation: Lessons Learned from SARS (Louisville, KY: 
University of Louisville School of Medicine, Institute for Bioethics, Health Policy and Law, 2003), 137, 
https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/cdc/SARS_REPORT.pdf. 
9 Nicole Lurie et al., “Local Variation in Public Health Preparedness: Lessons from California,” Health 
Affairs 23, no. supplement 1 (June 2004): W4–344, 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.W4.341.  
10 George J. Annas, Wendy K. Mariner, and Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemic Preparedness: The Need for 
a Public Health—Not a Law Enforcement/National Security—Approach (New York: American Civil 
Liberties Union, 2008), 11, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/privacy/pemic_report.pdf. 
11 Guenter B. Risse, Driven by Fear: Epidemics and Isolation in San Francisco’s House of Pestilence 
(Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2015), 61–63, ProQuest Ebook Central.  
12 Sam Adler-Bell and Barton Gellman, “The Disparate Impact of Surveillance,” The Century 
Foundation, December 17, 2017, https://tcf.org/content/report/disparate-impact-surveillance/. 
13 Patrick M. Eba, “Ebola and Human Rights in West Africa,” The Lancet 384, no. 9960 (December 
13, 2014): 2092–93, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(14)61412-4. 
5 
taking the necessary steps to stop the spread of contagious diseases. The literature reflects 
active debate about how to strike the proper balance. In an article published by the Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Erin M. Page argues that states have the 
power to enact quarantine laws, but do not have a right to abuse this power.14 Likewise, 
according to the ACLU, the public should not be required to “trade liberty for security” 
during an epidemic.15 To the ACLU, the collateral damage inflicted by law enforcement 
in forcing compliance argues against its use. Further, Annas et al. contend that when law 
enforcement enforced public health policies in the past, “people who were sick were 
frequently treated as if they had committed a crime.”16 Nonetheless, the courts have ruled 
in favor of forcing individuals to accept medical treatment and believe the needs of the 
public to be free of disease during a communicable disease event outweigh individual civil 
liberties. For example, in Jacobson vs. Massachusetts, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered an 
individual to be vaccinated against smallpox despite his objections.17 Viewed in the same 
light, it is entirely appropriate for law enforcement to participate on the public health team 
to enforce quarantine orders during a contagious disease outbreak. The literature review 
did not find a definitive, consensus view. Rather, it illustrates the competing interests 
concerning the public’s right to be free of disease versus the rights of the individual.  
3. Is Law Enforcement Needed to Enforce Quarantine Orders?  
Even more fundamental than the question of the proper role of law enforcement in 
a public health crisis is the bigger question of whether law enforcement is even necessary 
to ensure public compliance with quarantine orders. The literature is not settled on this 
question either. While some scholarly articles indicate law enforcement participation 
during communicable disease events helps stop the spread of disease, other research studies 
cast doubt on the need for law enforcement to enforce quarantine orders. For the pro-law 
 
14 Erin M. Page, “Balancing Individual Rights and Public Health Safety during Quarantine: The U.S. 
and Canada,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 38, no. 3 (2007): 519, 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1343&context=jil.  
15 Annas, Mariner, and Parmet, Pandemic Preparedness, 5. 
16 Annas, Mariner, and Parmet, 12. 
17 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
6 
enforcement camp, Lipsitch et al. report SARS patients in Singapore placed in quarantine 
and monitored by a multi-organizational effort, including law enforcement, infected far 
fewer citizens if they were compliant before the 4th day of their illness.18 Likewise, Dr. 
Rebecca Katz from the Milken Institute School of Public Health at George Washington 
University pointed out that a police officer can be an effective member of the public health 
team if the legal and social environment concerning quarantine changes and if quarantined 
people are only taken into custody if they are non-compliant.19  
Other research concludes that law enforcement participation during a pandemic is 
not effective. A study published in BioMed Central Public Health found only 28% of 
Canadians affected by quarantine orders imposed during the 2003 SARS outbreak agreed 
that law enforcement should be permitted to arrest citizens suspected of having a 
communicable disease.20 Some scholars believe Canadians only obeyed the order because 
of an understood civic duty not to spread disease and not due to the threat of being placed 
under arrest or quarantine by law enforcement.21 Such journal articles call into question 
the need for law enforcement to enforce quarantine orders if their participation will only 
exacerbate problems during an epidemic.  
This literature review reveals the depth of the unresolved issues surrounding law 
enforcement and quarantine orders. No one is sure what the role of law enforcement should 
be, which is driven by two considerable uncertainties, what is the proper balance of 
individual rights vs. public benefits and is law enforcement even a necessary component 
to ensure quarantine compliance. U.S. law enforcement organizations participating on the 
 
18 Marc Lipsitch et al., “Transmission Dynamics and Control of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome,” 
Science 300, no. 5627 (June 20, 2003): 1966–70, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1086616.  
19 Rebecca Katz, Shifting the Culture of Quarantine, Scowcroft Paper, no. 4 (College Station, TX: 
Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, 2017), 8, http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/158836. 
20 C. Shawn Tracy, Elizabeth Rea, and Ross E. G. Upshur, “Public Perceptions of Quarantine: 
Community-based Telephone Survey Following an Infectious Disease Outbreak,” BMC Public Health 9, 
no. 470 (2009): 1–8, https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2458-9-470. 
21 Clete DiGiovanni et al., “Factors Influencing Compliance with Quarantine in Toronto during the 
2003 SARS Outbreak,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 2, no. 4 
(2004): 265–72, https://doi.org/10.1089/bsp.2004.2.265.  
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public health team during communicable disease events can expect these issues to arise 
and impact their operations while enforcing quarantine orders.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis evaluates three policy option recommendations that address the role of 
law enforcement during a communicable disease event. The goal of the policy option 
evaluation is to determine the most practical and sensible policy recommendation. 
Implementation of the plan should strive to seek voluntary compliance by the citizens of 
Philadelphia. The quarantine enforcement plan should be implemented while emphasizing 
the need to maintain the rights and safety of all. 
1. Policy Option A—Forced Quarantine 
Forced quarantine is a policy that restricts the movement of the potentially 
contagious patient. This policy option coerces people to serve their quarantine in their 
homes, hospitals, college dormitories, or government facilities. This policy does not always 
provide due process to the affected patients. Additionally, the government can arbitrarily 
set the length of the quarantine period without regard to established medical practices. The 
case studies of forced quarantine that occurred in China and South Korea are explored 
because the primary focus of these policies is to restrict the movement of people regardless 
of the loss of personal freedoms. 
During the 2003 SARS epidemic in China, the government introduced a forced 
quarantine policy. Citizens had to stay in their homes or hospital while being treated, and 
those citizens who did not comply were arrested and taken to prison. This episode of forced 
quarantine separated potentially infected citizens from others, but did not provide due 
process, the ability to contest the government’s actions, to those affected. The Chinese 
government even invoked the threat of the death penalty for people who spread SARS to 
others.22 
 
22 Tommy T. B. Koh, Aileen J. Plant, and Eng Hin Lee, The New Global Threat: Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome and Its Impacts (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 2003), 77, 
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/reader.action?docID=3050881. 
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During the 2015 outbreak of Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome-Coronavirus 
(MERS-CoV), South Korea also enacted forced quarantine policies. Under the National 
Security Act of South Korea, the government can enforce quarantine orders on any persons 
who may compromise the “safety of the State.”23 Affected South Korean citizens were 
subjected to fines and prison terms if they did not comply with forced quarantine orders. 
2. Policy Option B—Self-quarantine 
The use of a self-quarantine policy also involves the restriction of citizens who may 
be infected with a potentially communicable disease. While forced quarantine orders 
resemble incarceration, self-quarantine orders rely on the affected individuals to report to 
the local department of public health that they are still compliant. The communication 
required to accomplish this task can be by telephone, closed circuit television, or by a visit 
from a member of the public health team to the patient’s location.  
The 2003 SARS epidemic affected Canada, among other places, and the 
government responded by implementing self-quarantine orders to help stop the spread of 
the disease. Canadian citizens largely did not require law enforcement intervention to 
enforce quarantine. The success of the self-quarantine orders directly relied on the citizens 
of the Toronto metro area to comply voluntarily. According to Julian Fantino, the former 
police chief of the Toronto Police Service (TPS), only one citizen had to be served with a 
warrant because of non-compliance with self-quarantine orders.24 This event is not only 
examined as an example of self-quarantine because of the level of citizen cooperation that 
occurred, but also because the socio-economic status of Canada closely resembles that of 
the United States. 
3. Policy Option C—Hybrid 
This policy option includes having law enforcement provide surveillance and escort 
services for quarantined patients, and working collaboratively with government and non-
 
23 “National Security Act of South Korea,” Korean Legislation Research Institute, art. 1, accessed 
April 20, 2019, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=26692&lang=ENG. 
24 Julian Fantino, “2003 SARS Outbreak; The Response of the Toronto Police Service,” Police Chief 
Magazine, 72, no. 3 (2005): 1–8. 
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government agencies to assist with non-compliant quarantine patients. It also includes 
establishing law enforcement quarantine extraction teams for citizens who do not comply 
with quarantine orders. 
4. Judging Criteria 
The criteria for judging the three policy recommendation options measures success 
based on four different factors: effectiveness, community support, cost (dollars and lives), 
and ease of implementation. 
Effectiveness is measured using multiple factors, such as time to control the number 
of infected individuals, and the number of citizens who must be placed in quarantine by 
law enforcement. Injuries and deaths that occur because of law enforcement participation 
and the financial cost to the City of Philadelphia are also evaluated. The measurement of 
effectiveness is adjusted according to the issues presented by the communicable disease 
event. Although one policy recommendation option may be more effective than others 
may, the totality of the circumstances is considered.  
Community support is a judging criterion because citizens will be more likely to 
comply with quarantine orders if they believe the orders are being served in the best interest 
of their health and well-being. This thesis considers the potential impact law enforcement 
may have while enforcing quarantine orders during a communicable disease event. The 
assessment includes the potential effect enforcement of quarantine orders has on the 
competing interests of citizens concerned about the preservation of their civil rights versus 
the public interest to protect against the spread of a disease that may cause illness and death.  
The cost of the proposed policy recommendations options is measured against the 
parameters of dollars and lives lost. The assessment includes the advantages and 
disadvantages that can occur after the application of self-quarantine and examines the 
conflict of interests that can occur when trying to maintain the privacy of citizens while 
also protecting the community against the threat of widespread illness as the result of a 
communicable disease. An assessment of the three policy option recommendations must 
take into account the financial and personal costs of implementation.  
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The ease of implementation also is assessed. This thesis considers the possible 
repercussions that may occur while implementing each of the three different policy 
recommendation options. The evaluation of the implementation includes the conflicts 
faced when balancing the civil rights of citizens against the necessity to maintain the public 
health in the event of a communicable disease epidemic. 
The evaluation criteria are ranked using a 5-point Likert scale, as shown in Table 
1, ranging from low (1) to high (5). For example, an evaluation found to be low (1) indicates 
the measured parameter had no success or did not cause the communicable disease event 
to end. The description of the grading standards is as follows: 
(1) Effectiveness 
1. Government policy or inaction prolongs communicable disease event.  
2. Government policy or inaction does not cause the stop of the 
communicable disease event. 
3. Government policy or inaction slowly ends communicable disease event. 
4. Government policy or action ends the communicable disease event. 
5. Government policy or action rapidly ends the communicable disease 
event.  
(2) Community Support 
1. Demonstrated hostility (riots, protest, etc.) toward government as a result 
of government policy or inaction. 
2. Some quarantine compliance noted in some communities, continued 
resistance in others. 
3. Quarantine compliance and non-compliance seemingly occur equally. 
4. Quarantine compliance with little non-compliance noted. 
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5. High quarantine compliance with no reported incidents of non-
compliance.  
(3) Cost 
1. Quarantine policy or government inaction creates financial burden to most 
individuals, businesses, and/or government.  
2. Quarantine policy or government inaction creates financial burden to some 
but not all individuals, businesses, and/or government. 
3. Quarantine policy or government inaction has no correlation to costs 
incurred by individuals, businesses, and/or government. 
4. Financial costs to individuals, businesses, and government begin to cease 
as a result of implemented quarantine policy. 
5. Financial costs to individuals, businesses, and government completely 
cease as a result of implemented quarantine policy.  
(4) Implementation Ease 
1. Quarantine policy cannot be not implemented, or no policy is instituted. 
2. Quarantine policy is implemented with few concerns of protecting the 
civil liberties of citizens; forced quarantine imposed. 
3. Quarantine policy is implemented successfully in some areas; resistance 
occurs in other areas.  
4. Quarantine policy is implemented with some considerations given to the 
protection of civil liberties.  
5. Quarantine policy is easily implemented without imposing any undue 
burdens to citizens.  
6.  
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Table 1. Evaluation Criteria Are Ranked Using a 5-point Likert Scale 




Quarantine     
B-Self-
quarantine     
C-Hybrid     
 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This thesis continues by evaluating Philadelphia’s communicable disease history 
(Chapter II). It next explores quarantine episodes in China, South Korea, Canada, and the 
United States, and Ebola epidemics in Zaire, and later in the renamed Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (Chapter III). This thesis then demonstrates the manner in which quarantine 
enforcement measures can be applied (Chapter IV). Chapter V presents suggestions for the 
implementation of a quarantine enforcement plan, to include the creation of a police 
department quarantine enforcement directive, revision of existing public health quarantine 
plans, and ideas for reinforcing the communication and collaboration necessary to involve 
relevant stakeholders. 
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II. COMMUNICABLE DISEASE HISTORY IN PHILADELPHIA 
This chapter examines the facts and circumstances that have contributed to the 
communicable disease history in Philadelphia. This chapter also reviews the responses to 
these disease outbreaks. A summary of federal, state, and local laws that regulate 
communicable disease events is also presented. A history of the laws that authorize the use 
of quarantine is examined. This review provides background information that can inform 
the development of a humane quarantine enforcement policy for the PPD. 
A. 1793 YELLOW FEVER EPIDEMIC 
The city of Philadelphia has been affected by communicable disease epidemics 
throughout its history. In 1793, over 5,000 of Philadelphia’s 50,000 citizens succumbed to 
the effects of yellow fever, a viral disease transmitted by mosquitoes. This disastrous 
outbreak was not ended by any government action, such as isolation or quarantine, but 
rather by the chilly fall weather that killed off the infected mosquitoes.25  
In the aftermath of that public health debacle, the Philadelphia Board of Health 
acted to prevent further deadly epidemics. The city erected a lazaretto; a term derived from 
St. Lazarus, the patron saint of lepers and which has been used to designate maritime 
quarantine stations since the 14th century.26 Located 10 miles south of the city in Delaware 
County, Pennsylvania, the Philadelphia lazaretto was finished nearly a century before 
immigrants would be screened for communicable diseases on Ellis Island in New York. 
The Philadelphia lazaretto was considered a state-of-the-art facility at the time, and one 
local newspaper stated that it could be mistaken for the “grounds of a wealthy gentleman” 
 
25 Samuel A. Gum, “Philadelphia under Siege: The Yellow Fever of 1793,” Pennsylvania Center for 
the Book, Summer 2010, https://pabook.libraries.psu.edu/literary-cultural-heritage-map-pa/feature-
articles/philadelphia-under-siege-yellow-fever-1793. 
26 Jeannette Woods, “America’s Oldest Quarantine Hospital Tied to Philadelphia Yellow Fever 
History,” WHYY (blog). January 9, 2014, https://whyy.org/segments/americas-oldest-quarantine-hospital-
tied-to-philadelphia-yellow-fever-history/.  
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except for the yellow quarantine flag posted outside the hospital.27 Although viewed as 
necessary by the Philadelphia Board of Health, the time spent at this lazaretto by sailors, 
slaves, and cargo often translated to death from infectious illnesses, spoiled cargo, and lost 
wages.28 The construction of the lazaretto marked one of the city’s first attempts to 
mitigate a communicable disease event. The lazaretto was basically the first enforced 
isolation and quarantine facility in Philadelphia that separated potentially infected people 
and products from others and helped stop the spread of disease.  
The Philadelphia Board of Health, now known as the PDPH, forced all sailors, 
slaves, and cargo to be inspected at the lazaretto prior to entering Philadelphia.29 In 1800, 
the U.S. Navy warship U.S.S. Ganges seized two ships carrying slaves near Cuba. U.S. 
sailors commandeered the ships and sailed north to Philadelphia where the slaves 
disembarked to await their fate. U.S. federal judge Richard Peters determined the slaves 
had been illegally captured and they were turned over to the Pennsylvania Abolition 
Society where they became indentured servants until they reached 18 years of age. Many 
of the slaves were given the surname Ganges.30 Later, in 1824, Dr. James Mease described 
the role of the quarantine master as the person who “prevents intercourse between vessels 
and the shore, and preserves order, and enforces obedience to the provision of the health 
 
27 Jim Byrne, “The Philadelphia Lazaretto: A Most Unloved Institution,” Pennsylvania Center for the 
Book, Summer 2010, https://pabook.libraries.psu.edu/literary-cultural-heritage-map-pa/feature-
articles/philadelphia-lazaretto-most-unloved-institution. 
28 Woods, “America’s Oldest Quarantine Hospital Tied to Philadelphia Yellow Fever History.” 
29 James Higgins, “Board of Health (Philadelphia),” Encyclopedia of Greater Philadelphia, accessed 
October 19, 2019, https://philadelphiaencyclopedia.org/archive/public-health/. 




law, and the regulations of the board.”31 The remote distance from Philadelphia, coupled 
with the laws of the time, prevented people remanded to the lazaretto from leaving and 
harming others. 
A facility, such as a lazaretto, no longer exists in Philadelphia. Thus, while the 
PDPH still considers quarantine an effective tool to stop the spread of communicable 
diseases, no designated space designed to be used for quarantine purposes is available in 
the city. Therefore, the current IQP lacks a comprehensive method to enforce quarantine 
orders, and the police department does not use a lazaretto to contain potentially infected 
people.  
B. 1918 SPANISH INFLUENZA EPIDEMIC 
The Spanish Flu, which is now referred to as the H1N1 virus, killed an estimated 
675,000 people in the United States and 50 million people worldwide a century ago.32 The 
Spanish Flu pandemic of 1918 did not come as a surprise to government officials in the 
city of Philadelphia; as it spread across the United States, reports about a flu emanating 
from Boston had been distributed in Philadelphia in the summer of 1918.33 
It has been determined that people standing in close proximity to each other while 
attending a parade down a major Philadelphia thoroughfare that fall contributed to this 
disease outbreak. During World War I, numerous parades were held to strengthen 
 
31 James Mease, The Picture of Philadelphia, Giving an Account of its Origin, Increase and 










32 Douglas Jordan, Terrence Tumpey, and Barbara Jester, “The Discovery and Reconstruction of the 
1918 Pandemic Virus,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, accessed June 11, 2019, 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/reconstruction-1918-virus.html. 
33 “The Flu in Philadelphia,” PBS American Experience, accessed October 17, 2018, 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/influenza-philadelphia/. 
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patriotism and sell war bonds to support the overseas effort. In Philadelphia, the fourth 
Liberty Loan parade held on September 28, 1918, traveled south on Broad Street and 
culminated at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. Although the first cases of the Spanish Flu in 
Philadelphia were reported on September 17, 1918, no public health measures focused on 
public distancing were ordered.34 Parade attendees were exposed to the Spanish Flu and, 
within 72 hours, every bed in the city’s 31 hospitals was filled.35 More people worldwide 
died during the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic than died during World War I.36 The epidemic 
ultimately claimed the lives of over 20,000 people in Philadelphia before running its 
course.37  
The PDPH was ill equipped to respond to the Spanish Flu crisis. The quick onset 
of a deadly disease and the lack of timely public health orders utilizing social distancing, 
coupled with deployment of the city’s healthcare workers to overseas assignments, an 
incomplete understanding of the disease, and the lack of a legitimate vaccine, prompted 
this catastrophic event in Philadelphia. In contrast, Spanish Flu cases were reported in St. 
Louis on October 5, 1918, and public health orders prohibiting mass gatherings were 
instituted two days later. The quick public health response is widely credited as saving 
thousands of lives; the Spanish Flu was responsible for 1,703 deaths in St. Louis.38 
By the winter of 1918, the Spanish Flu epidemic had run its course. Although 
Philadelphia suffered a great loss of life during this communicable disease event, no 
 
34 Stephen S. Morse, “Pandemic Influenza: Studying the Lessons of History,” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 104, no. 18 (May 1, 2007): 7313–14, 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0702659104. 
35 Kenneth C. Davis, “Philadelphia Threw a WWI Parade that Gave Thousands of Onlookers the Flu,” 
Smithsonian, September 21, 2018, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/philadelphia-threw-wwi-
parade-gave-thousands-onlookers-flu-180970372/. 
36 “Spanish Flu,” History, February 22, 2019, https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-i/1918-flu-
pandemic;”Casualties of World War I,” Facing History and Ourselves, accessed September 10, 2019, 
https://www.facinghistory.org/weimar-republic-fragility-democracy/politics/casualties-world-war-i-
country-politics-world-war-i. 
37 PBS American Experience, “The Flu in Philadelphia.” 
38 Blythe Bernhard, “St. Louis Saw the Deadly 1918 Spanish Flu Epidemic Coming. Shutting down 




memorial marking has been erected to honor those who passed. The Mütter Museum of the 
College of Physicians of Philadelphia marked the 100th anniversary, ironically, by holding 
a parade along the same route on Broad Street. The parade allowed attendees to sponsor 
one of the 1918 victims by claiming that name from the event website; attendees were 
provided education about communicable diseases, free influenza vaccinations, and a 
sample of music of the era.39  
Although the epidemic was short lived, the death toll was significant. An important 
takeaway from this epidemic concerns the speed and lethality of the disease. The 
circumstances of the time fell far short of modern standards of care, such as the use of 
antibiotics and accurate disease reporting. The next communicable disease event may also 
play out quickly and cause so many cases that it may not allow the police department to 
address its role in the public health mission as the situation unfolds. 
C. 1976 LEGIONNAIRE’S DISEASE 
Many conventions took place in Philadelphia for the U.S. Bicentennial celebration 
of 1976. The American Legion’s convention was held at the Bellevue Stratford Hotel on 
Broad Street in the center of the city. During the convention, and shortly thereafter, a 
number of American Legion members, who were nicknamed “Legionnaires,” complained 
of flu-like symptoms.40 Since many Legionnaires did not report these symptoms until they 
had returned to their homes located throughout Pennsylvania, the lag delayed a response 
to the outbreak. The outbreak of this new disease eventually led to 34 deaths.41 
Given the swift onset of the disease and the delay in deaths after leaving 
Philadelphia, no actions taken by the municipal government of Philadelphia contributed to 
 
39 “Spit Spreads Death: The Influenza Pandemic of 1918–19 in Philadelphia,” The Mütter Museum, 
accessed September 10, 2019, http://muttermuseum.org/exhibitions/going-viral-behind-the-scenes-at-a-
medical-museum/; “Join the Parade this September,” Spit Spreads Death, accessed September 10, 2019, 
https://www.spitspreadsdeath.com/. 
40 Sandy Higgins, “11 Things You Might Not Know about Legionnaires’ Disease,” Philadelphia 
Magazine (blog), July 22, 2016, https://www.phillymag.com/news/2016/07/22/legionnaires-disease-
philadelphia/. 
41 Lawrence K. Altman, “In Philadelphia 30 Years Ago, an Eruption of Illness and Fear,” New York 
Times, August 1, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/01/health/01docs.html. 
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the end of the epidemic. Six months later, epidemiologists from the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) determined the source to be contaminated standing water 
pumped through the air as a mist into the lobby from the hotel’s air conditioning ducts.42 
Consequently, the CDC now recommends proper maintenance of air conditioning systems 
and testing the water in pools and hot tubs to prevent the transmission of Legionella. On 
this point, Legionella is typically spread from contaminated water sources and not person-
to-person.43 Yet, the PDPH now classifies Legionella pneumophila as a reportable disease 
and issues public health warnings when outbreaks occur.44  
The initial cause of Legionnaire’s Disease was unknown to healthcare professionals 
in 1976, and many of the affected immediately left Philadelphia after the convention. While 
quarantine would not have helped in this event (since Legionnaire’s Disease is not person-
to-person communicable), quarantine would have been impossible to institute given the 
uncertainty and the timing of the situation. The uncertainty that played out in 1976 could 
very well occur again. Thus, even in situations where quarantine is called for, it may not 
be possible to implement.  
D. 1991 MEASLES OUTBREAK 
Although the rubeola virus, the formal name for measles, can cause fever, cough, 
and conjunctivitis, an effective vaccine to protect against the disease has been available 
since 1963.45 The 1991 measles outbreak primarily affected the children of members of 
the Faith Tabernacle Church and the First Century Gospel Church in Philadelphia who 
have long rejected the use of modern medicine, including vaccinations, due to religious 
 
42 Christopher Klein, “Remembering the Legionnaires’ Outbreak,” History, August 22, 2018, 
https://www.history.com/news/the-discovery-of-legionnaires-disease. 
43 “Legionnaires Disease and Pontiac Fever,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Legionella, 
accessed July 9, 2019, https://www.cdc.gov/legionella/index.html. 
44 Society, Philadelphia County Medical, “PDPH Alert—Increase of Legionnaires’ Disease,” 
Philadelphia County Medical Society (blog), September 11, 2017, https://philamedsoc.org/pdph-alert-
increase-of-legionnaires-disease/. 
45 “Measles (Rubeola),” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, February 5, 2018, 
https://www.cdc.gov/measles/about/index.html. 
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beliefs.46 Both churches also operated schools, which exposed young children to the 
disease that subsequently had a profoundly negative effect.  
The PDPH took prompt action to pressure the leadership of the two congregations 
to accept medical treatment for those affected by the measles outbreak. The PDPH obtained 
a court order to require parishioners be vaccinated; however, the churches’ leaders sought 
legal help to maintain the right to refuse vaccination. When the case was presented to it, 
the ACLU refused to represent the two churches because it felt the parishioners were “not 
at liberty to martyr your child to your religion.”47  
Although the PDPH was able to enforce vaccinations against the disease legally, a 
quarantine was not necessary because, in essence, the children were self-quarantined in 
their religious-based schools. The action taken by the PDPH was swift, but the damage 
from the measles outbreak had already been done. The 1991 measles outbreak in 
Philadelphia concluded after the congregants of Faith Tabernacle Church and the First 
Century Gospel Church were forced to accept medical treatment, but it eventually led to 
the deaths of six children.48 In this case, the leadership of both churches complied with the 
demands set forth by the PDPH to accept medical treatment. In the future, this acceptance 
may not occur. Protocols need to be developed that will address the issue when citizens are 
non-compliant with public health orders. In that situation, law enforcement should have a 
clear policy to enforce quarantine orders. 
E. 2019 MUMPS OUTBREAK 
The mumps virus affects the salivary and parotid glands located in the neck and 
mouth that gives sufferers swollen cheeks and necks and often a fever and headaches. 
Patients typically recover in a few weeks and severe complications, including encephalitis 
 
46 Anders Kelto, “Why a Court Once Ordered Kids Vaccinated against Their Parents’ Will,” NPR, 
February 19, 2015, https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/02/19/386040745/why-a-court-once-
ordered-kids-vaccinated-against-their-parents-will. 
47 Kelto. 
48 Desiree V. Rodgers et al., “High Attack Rates and Case Fatality during a Measles Outbreak in 
Groups with Religious Exemption to Vaccination,” The Pediatric Infectious Disease Journal 12, no. 4 
(April 1993): 288–91, https://insights.ovid.com/crossref?an=00006454-199304000-00006.  
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and pancreatitis, are rare.49 The near eradication of measles, mumps, and rubella occurred 
after the development of a childhood vaccine in the 1960s.50 A 1998 study of British 
children suggesting that vaccinations caused autism and other disorders, however, made 
parents re-think their children’s vaccinations.51 Although a leading medical journal 
retracted this study because it was methodologically unsound, weak in sample size, and 
had an overly sweeping conclusion, the anti-vaccination movement remains convinced of 
the linkage between autism and vaccines.52 Statistics presented on PhilaVAX, a website 
operated by the PDPH, shows the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccination rate in 
the city consistently in the 90 percentile since 2008.53 
Students at Temple University in Philadelphia began to report suffering from the 
symptoms of the mumps in early 2019, and over 140 students were ultimately diagnosed 
with the virus.54 The spread of mumps can occur easily in areas where high concentrations 
of people are in close proximity to each other and the effectiveness of the MMR vaccine 
wanes at about the time people reach college age.55 The PDPH responded to the outbreak 
by collaborating with Temple University Hospital to provide MMR vaccinations to 
students and employees.  
The major stakeholders achieved a significant success in this communicable disease 
event. By working collaboratively and using the PDPH Health Information Portal (HIP) to 
 
49 “Mumps,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, accessed March 26, 2019, 
https://www.cdc.gov/mumps/index.html. 
50 “Complications of Mumps,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, accessed March 6, 2019, 
https://www.cdc.gov/mumps/about/complications.html. 
51 “Vaccine Myths Debunked,” PublicHealth, accessed July 11, 2019, 
https://www.publichealth.org/public-awareness/understanding-vaccines/vaccine-myths-debunked/. 
52 Richard Horton, “MMR—Responding to Retraction,” The Lancet 363, no. 9417 (April 17, 2004): 
1328, https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(04)16018-2/fulltext.  
53 “PhilaVax,” Division of Disease Control, Philadelphia Department of Public Health, accessed June 
21, 2019, https://vax.phila.gov/index.php/philavax/. 
54 Robert Moran, “Mumps Outbreak at Temple University Rises to 140 Cases,” The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, April 9, 2019, https://www.inquirer.com/news/mumps-outbreak-temple-university--
20190409.html. 




communicate updates about the disease, the PDPH and Temple University brought the 
epidemic under control.56 Collaboration between two stakeholders who do not typically 
work together will be essential if a quarantine enforcement plan is to succeed. Additionally, 
effective communication between the PDPH and Temple University was achieved using 
the HIP. Clear and timely information provided to relevant stakeholders during a 
communicable disease event can be used to decrease fear and panic and to help bring the 
situation under control. 
F. QUARANTINE LEGISLATION—PHILADELPHIA  
This purpose of this section is to describe how laws authorize the City of 
Philadelphia to enforce quarantine orders if necessary. Beginning with executive orders 
issued by the President of the United States and including the application of local 
ordinances that provide guidance to city agencies, this section examines quarantine orders 
to provide an historical perspective. The section concludes with a review of the rights 
afforded to patients who have been targeted by quarantine enforcement orders. 
1. Legal Authority to Enforce Quarantine Orders 
As the Chief Executive Officer of the nation, the president can mandate quarantine 
policies in disease outbreaks. For example, the president can issue an executive order to 
bar the entry of immigrants from countries that pose a risk to public health.57 Such orders 
list the names of diseases thought to be communicable health risks. Presidents have issued 
additional executive orders to add to the initial list of diseases that pose a public health 
threat and have also amended previous executive orders by removing eradicated 
communicable diseases from the list. On March 26, 1946, President Harry S. Truman 
issued Executive Order 9708 “to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of 
communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possession, or from one 
 
56 “Health Alerts,” Philadelphia Department of Public Health, accessed June 2, 2019, 
https://hip.phila.gov/HealthAlerts. 
57 “Proclamation 3004, Control of Persons Leaving or Entering the United States,” National Archives, 
National Register, January 17, 1953, https://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/proclamations/03004.html. 
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State possession into any other State possession.”58 Communicable diseases listed in this 
order include yellow fever, anthrax, and tuberculosis, among others.59 Many of the 
communicable diseases listed in Executive Order 9708, such as smallpox or various 
streptococcic infections, are no longer a public health threat because of the advancement 
of vaccinations or antibiotic medications, and have subsequently been deleted from the list 
over time. 
President John F. Kennedy amended Executive Order 9708 with Executive Order 
11070 on December 12, 1962. President Kennedy added chickenpox to the list of 
communicable diseases that pose a threat to public health.60 On April 4, 2003, President 
George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13925 to invoke the authority vested in him by 
the U.S. Constitution and the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 264 (b)) to declare that 
aliens traveling to the United States with specific communicable diseases would be refused 
entry or quarantined upon their arrival.61 The list of communicable diseases in Executive 
Order 13925 includes infectious tuberculosis and viral hemorrhagic diseases, such as Lassa 
fever and the Ebola virus, along with the following caveat, “and others not yet named,” 
which was included due to the ever-changing threat of communicable diseases.  
President Bush also issued Executive Order 13375 that served as an amendment to 
Executive Order 13925 and added influenza to the list of communicable diseases because 
some strains of that virus were capable of causing a pandemic.62 Executive Order 13674 
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issued by President Barack Obama on July 31, 2014 added SARS to the list of 
communicable diseases that pose a threat to public health.63  
Although the CDC has the legal authority to issue quarantines, it prefers that local 
public health departments quarantine and isolate communicable disease patients that put 
the community at risk. According to the CDC, federal authority should be used, “to 
quarantine an exposed person only in rare situations, such as [at] ports of entry or in similar 
time sensitive settings.”64  
2. Powers of Law Enforcement to Enforce Quarantine Policies 
Law enforcement must enforce quarantine policies without infringing on the rights 
of citizens. Law enforcement has long played a role in the enforcement of policies 
developed by public health departments in the United States. In the early 1900s, as Boston 
suffered from a smallpox epidemic, the local department of public health ordered 
mandatory vaccinations.65 The Boston Board of Health identified homeless and destitute 
people living in boarding houses and ordered them to be vaccinated, sometimes against 
their will. Thus, the Boston Board of Health authorized law enforcement to enter boarding 
homes and assist in the vaccination of residents.66 In this and all cases, law enforcement 
needs to balance the expectations of citizens subject to quarantine policies against the 
powers granted to law enforcement to carry out government policies and ensure public 
safety. 
Several court rulings in favor of the enforcement of quarantine policies have given 
public health departments the authority to invoke police powers. For example, in Barmore 
v. Robertson, a Chicago woman claimed she had been illegally quarantined in her own 
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home despite not experiencing the symptoms of typhoid fever. In 1921, the Chicago 
Department of Public Health tested Jennie Barmore, a boarding house owner, and found 
her to be a typhoid carrier. Barmore was ordered not to see any unvaccinated visitors or 
cook for anyone other than her husband.67 Barmore sought relief from the Supreme Court 
of Illinois; however, the court ruled in favor of the Chicago Department of Health. The 
Supreme Court of Illinois ruled, “it is not necessary that one be actually sick, as the term 
is usually applied, in order that the health authorities have the right to restrain his liberties 
by quarantine regulations.”68  
Law enforcement has a vital role in response to a communicable disease event. 
Executive orders, and federal, state, and local laws, can be used to authorize law 
enforcement officers to take action to stop the spread of disease. Along with investigating 
the incident to determine if a crime has been committed, law enforcement also has been 
tasked to ensure the protection of the vaccine delivery system in the event of a disease 
outbreak.69 Although it does not happen often, law enforcement also has been tasked with 
enforcing quarantine orders. Public health departments typically decide whether law 
enforcement will be required to enforce quarantine orders. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on whether procedural due process limits 
government decisions that deprive individuals of their liberty, which includes forced 
quarantines. In Mathews vs. Eldridge, the Supreme Court decided that due process can be 
flexible and outlined three factors to be considered as the situation demands: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.70 
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More recently, in Washington v. Milwaukee, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin heard 
the case of an infectious tuberculosis patient who was being forced to seek treatment under 
a quarantine order. Ruby Washington was living in a homeless shelter in Milwaukee when 
she tested positive at a clinic for tuberculosis. Washington received free medical treatment 
and bus tickets from the Milwaukee Department of Public Health; however, she refused to 
comply and left the homeless shelter.71 Washington later presented herself at a local 
hospital to give birth and was instructed to stay at the hospital and receive directly observed 
medical treatment for tuberculosis until she was no longer infectious.72 A compromise was 
reached that allowed Washington to be released once her medical status progressed to stay 
at her sister’s house for nine months until she was no longer contagious, and to continue to 
receive medication at a clinic; however, she left the home only one day after her discharge 
from the hospital. Washington was later arrested and jailed.73 The City sought an order of 
contempt against Washington for her failure to comply with the Health Department’s 
treatment order. The trial court denied the request, and instead entered a confinement order 
under the state’s “long-term confinement section of the tuberculosis control statute.”74 
A review of the case involving Ruby Washington demonstrates that she was 
diagnosed with tuberculosis while she was living in a homeless shelter. Washington’s only 
“crime” in this instance was that she contracted infectious tuberculosis and failed to comply 
multiple times with a directly observed treatment protocol. Although a compromise was 
struck that would allow Washington to avoid arrest and unnecessary restrictions on her 
liberty, Washington reneged on this agreement. The government of Milwaukee had a moral 
duty to protect the community from a variety of threats, including the possibility of 
introducing contagious diseases to the area, so it pursued the matter further.  
The City of Milwaukee’s interest in this case was to protect the community against 
the threat of infectious tuberculosis. The government of Milwaukee took a more restrictive 
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approach to Washington only after she repeatedly failed to comply with treatment plans. 
The Wisconsin tuberculous control statue follows the trajectory of the Mathews v. Eldridge 
case in that it institutes a four-part test to determine if and when a contagious citizen can 
be confined. The four conditions of the test are: (1) “the person has infectious tuberculosis, 
noninfectious tuberculosis but is at a high risk of developing infectious tuberculosis, or 
suspect tuberculosis,”75 (2) the person “has failed to comply with the prescribed treatment 
regimen . . . or that the disease is resistant to the medication prescribed” to the person, (3) 
“all other reasonable means of achieving voluntary compliance with treatment have been 
exhausted and no less restrictive alternative exists; or that no other medication to treat the 
resistant disease is available,”76 and (4) the person “poses an imminent and substantial 
threat to himself or herself or to the public health.”77 
In this case, the court balanced the civil rights of citizens against the public health 
interest to stop the spread of disease. After reviewing the facts of the case, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court ruled that Washington needed to be confined in a jail to stop the spread of 
infectious tuberculosis. The court took into account the highly infectious nature of the 
disease and Washington’s non-compliance with previous requests to maintain self-
isolation and participate in directly observed treatment before concluding that the local jail 
could be used for confinement:  
provided the jail is a place where proper care and treatment will be provided 
and the spread of disease will be prevented, and that no less restrictive 
alternative exists to jail confinement.78  
Forced isolation in this case was used as a last resort after all reasonable means to convince 
Washington to comply with treatment protocols failed.  
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3. Pennsylvania Disease Prevention Laws and Policies 
The standards for quarantine have been spelled out in Pennsylvania state law but 
lack the specifics found in other state statutes. The Pennsylvania Disease Prevention and 
Control Law of 1955 defines quarantine as the “limitation of freedom of movement of 
persons or animals that have been exposed to a communicable disease for a period of time 
equal to the longest usual incubation period.”79 This statute also allows the quarantine 
order to be modified based on the nature of the communicable disease; however, it does 
not describe how law enforcement will enforce a quarantine if the patient is non-compliant 
with the order. In contrast to the Wisconsin law concerning quarantine, no test procedure 
in Pennsylvania law exists to ensure the affected citizen is not quarantined unnecessarily. 
Additionally, the Pennsylvania law does not spell out that forced quarantine is only to be 
used if all other reasonable means have been tried and failed. The Pennsylvania law 
addresses quarantine but does not provide law enforcement with sufficient guidelines to 
carry out these orders. 
The Pennsylvania Code has since amended several provisions of the Pennsylvania 
Disease Prevention and Control Law of 1955 and now authorizes local boards of health to 
quarantine affected patients; however, it does not explicitly authorize law enforcement to 
carry out the quarantine order.80 Chapter 6–204 of the Philadelphia Code, which is titled 
“Quarantine and Isolation,” states the patient may be placed under quarantine for a period 
determined by the local board of health and for a period long enough to protect the 
community and prevent the spread of disease. Chapter 6 of the Philadelphia Code 
authorizes the PDPH to order patients to be quarantined if medically necessary to prevent 
the spread of communicable diseases.81  
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The IQP issued by the PDPH also vests the PPD with the authority to enforce 
quarantine orders.82 If the patient is non-compliant with the quarantine order, the IQP 
describes the process to obtain an emergency detention order. An emergency detention 
order operates in much the same way as an arrest or search warrant. A representative of the 
PDPH must appear before the presiding judge of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas 
or the representative judge to obtain the emergency detention order or arrest warrant if the 
patient to be quarantined does not comply with the order. The IQP states that the PPD will 
be responsible for escorting the quarantined patient using EMS to an appropriate facility; 
however, the plan does not provide any guidance concerning the appropriate use of force 
permitted during this arrest process or whether a search warrant may be authorized.83 
These important details need to be addressed before a communicable disease event, not 
while the crisis is occurring. 
4. Quarantine Enforcement and Patient’s Rights 
While law enforcement must uphold the law and protect the public interest, it also 
must ensure the rights of citizens are not unnecessarily infringed upon. Canadian law 
enforcement faced this issue when it had to enforce quarantine orders in the metropolitan 
Toronto area during the SARS outbreak. The population of Toronto during this timeframe 
was approximately five million people.84  
The TPS enforced the isolation of patients located inside Toronto area hospitals and 
performed quarantine related duties.85 In a study published by the Health Law Institute at 
the University of Alberta, researcher Nola Ries stated that government officials who 
publicly identify and assess public health interventions to be made, such as the enforcement 
of quarantine, are more likely to be successful in achieving public health goals and 
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maintaining patient’s rights.86 The Canadian viewpoint expressed in this health law review 
journal mimics the requirements described in Mathews vs. Eldridge. A report issued by the 
Institute for Bioethics, Health Policy and Law University of the Louisville School of 
Medicine noted, however, that citizens of the United States may not be as willing to comply 
with isolation and quarantine orders as citizens in other countries.87 
5. Psychosocial Aspects of Quarantine Policies 
One element of the PPD’s mandate to enforce quarantine orders is to provide 
escorts to EMS first responders transporting quarantined patients to hospitals or other 
treatment facilities. If these escorts allay the concerns of a quarantined patient, then the 
client may cooperate peacefully. Coherent, consistent, and easily accessible information 
provided by public health departments and other government agencies helped to assuage 
fears among quarantined patients in Canada.88 Cooperation and understanding among the 
relevant stakeholders in this process, to include law enforcement, the public health 
department, and the citizens of the community, can ensure safety and quickly end a 
communicable disease event. 
Information from the studies of Canadian SARS patients could provide invaluable 
insight for building a quarantine enforcement policy in the United States. These patients 
describe the loss and conflict they experienced during their quarantine periods, and the fear 
and frustration at being quarantined because of a communicable disease contracted through 
no fault of their own. According to these patients, a loss of income and social isolation 
from others were the most significant obstacles to being compliant with quarantine orders. 
The Canadian government sought to address these issues by conducting spot checks on 
quarantined citizens, having food and medical supplies delivered by volunteers, and 
 
86 Nola M. Ries, “Public Health Law and Ethics: Lessons from SARS and Quarantine,” Health Law 
Review 13, no. 1 (2004): 3–6, 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b3f2/5e98cbf81576261dcdf15488101c0fafdd3f.pdf. 
87 Rothstein et al., Quarantine and Isolation: Lessons Learned from SARS, 12.  
88 Emma Robertson et al., “The Psychosocial Effects of Being Quarantined Following Exposure to 
SARS: A Qualitative Study of Toronto Health Care Workers,” The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 49, no. 
6 (June 2004): 403–407, https://doi.org/10.1177/070674370404900612.  
30 
releasing legitimate health crisis information in a timely manner.89 These practices could 
be adopted for U.S. quarantine enforcement plans to assist citizens to maintain quarantine 
compliance. The inclusion of non-traditional stakeholders in the quarantine enforcement 
plan can be a force multiplier in larger cities, like Philadelphia, where municipal resources 
are already strained. 
Drawing similar conclusions, Sarbjit S. Johal notes the distress and fear of 
quarantined patients because of poor communication and information provided by 
government organizations and infection control experts. Johal advocates for a “transparent 
and credible public information strategy” as the best method to prevent widespread panic 
and fear in the affected communities.90 The three-factor test emanating from the Mathews 
vs. Eldridge case and the results of the University of Alberta Health Law Review study 
generated by Nola Ries indicate it is possible to preserve patient’s rights during quarantine 
enforcement. Quarantine enforcement must be minimally intrusive, and the plan must be 
effectively publicized, so the maximum number of patients has the opportunity to be 
compliant. Finally, quarantine enforcement by law enforcement officers must only take 
place after other attempts to encourage compliance have been attempted and the means 
employed to make a person comply with a treatment protocol must at every stage be the 
least restrictive means available. Providing a clear infection control and quarantine strategy 
can help citizens of the community become stakeholders in the plan to stop the spread of 
communicable disease. 
The next chapter of this thesis examines the use of quarantine enforcement plans 
that have been implemented globally with varying degrees of success. The case studies 
examine not only the U.S. implementation of quarantine, but also what occurred in China, 
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Canada, and South Korea. The quarantine plans used by the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo during the latest outbreak of Ebola are examined along with how the country, then 
known as Zaire, addressed the first outbreak of the disease. The lessons learned during 
these episodes provide a keen insight into how U.S. law enforcement can participate and 
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III. QUARANTINE EXPERIENCES 
This chapter reviews literature describing the enforcement of quarantine orders 
during infectious disease epidemics that occurred in Canada, China, South Korea, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the United States between 1976 and 2018 to gain 
insight into how such orders can be implemented by U.S. law enforcement. Such an 
examination will help fully develop the IQP issued by the PDPH that presently lacks 
specifics on how law enforcement should implement these policies. The research design 
establishes criteria to measure the effectiveness of the response in each case study and 
determine if the policies and actions taken during these events can be adapted for use by 
the PPD.  
Forced quarantine policies are policies enacted by governments to require 
communicable disease patients to stay in their homes and face jail time if non-compliant 
or be placed in government facilities or hospitals. Patients subjected to forced quarantine 
orders in the following case studies served their quarantine in hospitals, college 
dormitories, and other government facilities. The incubation period of the pertinent 
contagious diseases determined the length of forced quarantine that each patient served. 
This chapter examines forced quarantine to determine whether components of these 
policies can be implemented by U.S. law enforcement.  
Self-quarantine policies also have been used to stop the spread of disease, but in 
these situations, law enforcement is not depended on to make arrests to ensure compliance. 
In one case examined, the affected quarantined citizens largely complied with the self-
quarantine order on their own. In the other case, the community where the disease outbreak 
occurred was so naturally isolated that law enforcement was not required to arrest people 
for non-compliance. In these case studies, governments did not rely primarily on law 
enforcement to compel communicable disease patients into compliance.  
Both forced and self-quarantine policies have been used in the past to stop the 
spread of disease, but these policies mutated once the communicable disease event began 
to unfold. These hybrid quarantine policies utilize methods found in both forced and self-
34 
quarantine policies felt to be successful at the beginning phases of an outbreak but delete 
practices that did not seem to contribute to ending the communicable disease event. In 
China during the 2003 SARS epidemic, the government imposed forced quarantine policies 
that compelled many patients to stay in prisons, hospitals, and college dormitories until 
they were no longer contagious. Forced quarantine was restrictive and met with resistance 
from Chinese citizens.91 Forced quarantine along with other measures, such as evidence-
based practices as contact tracing and hospital containment measures, proved to be 
effective in stopping the spread of disease.92 Contact tracing is the practice of identifying 
and following up with people who have come in contact with contagious patients. The 
follow-up period should be determined by the nature of the disease in question.93 The 
Chinese forced quarantine plan became a hybrid quarantine plan once evidence-based 
practices were adopted. Hybrid quarantine policies are examined to determine whether 
these methods could be used by U.S. law enforcement to stop the spread of disease 
effectively. 
As noted in Chapter I, the case studies presented in this thesis are measured using 
four parameters. The effectiveness, community support, cost, and ease of implementation 
of each quarantine episode are judged. By critiquing past quarantine episodes using these 
considerations, the components of a plan can be developed to resolve quarantine issues in 
the future. Effectiveness is measured by the amount of time it took to control the 
quarantined citizens along with the number of people who had to be quarantined by law 
enforcement. Additionally, the number of deaths incurred during the quarantine episode is 
evaluated in the effectiveness category. The measurement of effectiveness also takes into 
account the totality of circumstances. For example, those implementing public health 
orders in some of the countries examined may not be required to consider the civil liberties 
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of the affected citizens. Community support is a measurement that needs to be evaluated 
because people who believe quarantine orders are in their best interest are more likely to 
comply. This parameter also weighs the interests of individual citizens against the public 
interest to stop the spread of disease. The cost incurred as the result of quarantine plan 
implementation considers not only the financial burden to individual citizens, but also to 
government and businesses. The ease of implementation considers the repercussions faced 
by both citizens impacted by and the governments implementing quarantine policies. While 
a quarantine plan may be easily implemented, it may not guarantee the policy is successful. 
Each factor is rated within each case study on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest 
attainable score.  
A. FORCED QUARANTINE 
Two episodes of forced quarantine are examined to determine viability for use in 
the United States. The SARS communicable disease outbreak in China during 2003 and 
the 2015 MERS-CoV epidemic that occurred in South Korea were forced quarantine 
events. They fit this category because government officials attempted to compel affected 
citizens into facilities to stop the spread of disease.  
1. SARS—People’s Republic of China (2003) 
The 2003 SARS pandemic quickly spread to other countries and controlling it 
presented new challenges to members of the public health care team. SARS first presented 
in a patient who lived in the Guangdong province, China during November 2002. The index 
patient, otherwise known as the first identified patient during a communicable disease 
outbreak, was a college professor who traveled to Hong Kong and stayed on the ninth floor 
of the Metropole Hotel. While there, he infected others who eventually traveled to Canada 
and Singapore.94 Although public health officials knew of the disease, official 
acknowledgment did not take place until February 11, 2003. Guangdong province public 
health officials declared only 305 SARS cases, but this total was later found to be grossly 
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underreported.95 Initially, China relied on the use of forced quarantine policies and the 
refusal to provide accurate and timely information to the public to show that the outbreak 
was under control.  
a. Policy 
Beijing enacted quarantine policies to prevent patients from leaving hospitals until 
treatment had been completed. Police officers investigated suspected SARS patients and 
placed them under quarantine when they were located.96 Regina Ip, Hong Kong’s 
Secretary for Security, believed the need to protect the civil liberties of citizens delayed the 
SARS response, and she insisted the practice would not continue. As she asserted, “The 
common reaction is, we should have moved faster, been more draconian. … Human rights 
concerns are not a problem in dealing with SARS.”97  
The Chinese government used forced quarantine to herd communicable disease 
patients into government facilities involuntarily.98 When the number of SARS patients in 
the region began to increase, the World Health Organization (WHO) began to question the 
SARS statistics being provided by the Chinese government.99 Eventually, the WHO was 
able to assist the Chinese government by recommending the use of contact tracing and 
hospital containment measures to stop the spread of SARS.100  
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b. Effectiveness 
The Chinese government rapidly enacted forced quarantine policies on large 
numbers of people. While the Chinese government did not object to violating the rights of 
its citizens in the process, this method did not resolve the epidemic. The initial approach to 
stop the spread of disease by using forced quarantine was eventually replaced by an 
evidenced-based approach recommended by the WHO. The evidence-based approach, 
which included such practices as the use of contact tracing and hospital containment 
measures, contributed to the end of the 2003 SARS outbreak. The assessment of the 
effectiveness scores is low because these measures did not stop the spread of disease. 
c. Community Support 
The community support demonstrated during this episode validates the necessity of 
compliance when implementing quarantine to stop the spread of disease. A patient with a 
highly infectious strain of the virus was hospitalized in Guangzhou and eventually treated 
and transferred to three different hospitals, which led to the infection spreading to 
approximately 200 people, many of whom were healthcare workers.101 Subsequently, the 
Chinese government ordered the quarantine of all SARS patients and people suspected of 
having SARS, and those subjected to the order had to stay in their homes, college 
dormitories, or prisons. Patients who were non-compliant with quarantine orders faced a 
10-year prison sentence, life imprisonment, or execution.102 According to a report posted 
on the Australian Broadcasting Company website, 10,000 people were quarantined in 
Nanjing, and the residents of two smaller villages destroyed government quarantine centers 
and assaulted staff members.103 The negative reaction displayed by affected Chinese 
citizens indicates a low level of community support for the implementation of forced 
quarantine policies.  
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The unnecessary overuse of forced quarantine on Chinese citizens did not positively 
affect the outcome of this outbreak. Chinese citizens resisted this policy and it did not stop 
the spread of SARS. The SARS outbreak continued despite the introduction of forced 
quarantine and contributed further to the distrust citizens had of their government officials. 
The continued loss of life during the period of forced quarantine along with the unneeded 
intrusion into the lives of Chinese citizens justifies a low score in this category. 
d. Cost 
The financial cost to China during the 2003 SARS epidemic was substantial. SARS 
caused a downturn in tourism during this communicable disease event; the World 
Economic Forum scheduled to be held in Beijing was delayed and the Rolling Stones 
canceled concerts in Beijing and Shanghai.104 Researchers predicted the loss to the tourism 
industry would exceed 25 billion in U.S. dollars.105 It is also estimated that the epidemic 
caused a one percent decrease in the gross domestic product (GDP) of China during 
2003.106 The cost assessment for application of forced quarantine receives a low grade due 
to the high financial cost suffered by China coupled with forced quarantine not being a 
causative factor responsible for ending the outbreak.  
e. Implementation Ease 
The implementation of forced quarantine policies on the Chinese citizens directly 
affected by SARS was neither impeded by the requirement to preserve civil rights, the need 
to reimburse organizations financially that had to house citizens, nor the cost incurred by 
the organizations that housed citizens unnecessarily. In this very limited view, forced 
quarantine policies were implemented with relative ease. Forced quarantine policies 
 
104 “SARS May Force Change on China,” Bloomberg Businessweek, April 21, 2003, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2003-04-20/sars-may-force-change-on-china; Arthur Jones, 
“SARS Fear Slowing China,” Variety (blog), April 16, 2003, https://variety.com/2003/biz/news/sars-fear-
slowing-china-1117884719/. 
105 Wen Hai et al., “The Short-Term Impact of SARS on the Chinese Economy,” Asian Economic 
Papers 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 57–61, https://doi.org/10.1162/1535351041747905.  
106 Landis MacKellar, “Pandemic Influenza: A Review,” Population and Development Review 33, no. 
3 (2007): 429–51, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2007.00179.x. 
39 
receive an elevated effectiveness grade based on a very narrow assessment of this criterion. 
Refer to Table 2 for a summary of the assessment scores of the SARS—People’s Republic 
of China forced quarantine policy. 
Table 2. SARS—People’s Republic of China Forced Quarantine Summary 
Table with Assessment Scores 
SARS—People’s Republic of 
China (2003) 
Grade 
(1 low to 5 high) 
Effectiveness 1 
Community Support 1 
Cost 1 
Implementation Ease 3 
 
2. MERS-CoV—Republic of Korea (2015) 
The first reported case of MERS-CoV in South Korea occurred in May 2015 after 
a patient reported taking commercial flights to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates. After his return to South Korea, the patient presented himself to a hospital for 
treatment. This index patient was treated at two different South Korean hospitals and found 
to be responsible for infecting 25 people with MERS-CoV.107 A study conducted by Jung 
Wan Park et al. shows that the South Korean practice of hospital shopping, and improper 
infection control standards in South Korean hospitals, sparked the outbreak.108 South 
Koreans routinely seek medical care from multiple hospitals. This phenomenon occurs 
because citizens believe excellent medical care can be obtained at the largest hospitals in 
Seoul.  
During the MERS-CoV event, officials learned that South Koreans from small 
towns visited several rural hospitals to obtain a referral to a larger hospital in the country’s 
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capital.109 The WHO would later describe this crisis as the largest MERS-CoV outbreak 
to occur outside of Saudi Arabia; 138 confirmed cases and 38 deaths were attributed to this 
communicable disease outbreak.110 
a. Policy 
In response to the epidemic, the South Korean government ordered the quarantine 
of over 1,300 people suspected of having contact with MERS-CoV patients. Most of these 
patients were quarantined at home.111 The South Korean government passed legislation 
that allowed public health officials to place people in quarantine and required police 
officers and other civil servants to enforce quarantine orders.112 Non-compliant citizens, 
including people suspected of breaking the law who were caught lying about their 
infectious disease status, could have been imprisoned for two years and fined 20 million 
won ($18,000 U.S. dollars). For example, authorities tracked down two South Korean 
women who traveled to Hong Kong to avoid the quarantine order, and arrested and forcibly 
quarantined them at a holiday park in the Hong Kong town of Sai Kung. The pair ultimately 
faced fines of HK$5,000 dollars and six months of imprisonment.113 The South Korean 
government also authorized the tracking of cell phones belonging to affected citizens to 
determine compliance with quarantine policies.114  
 
109 Choe Sang-Hun, “MERS Virus’s Path: One Man, Many South Korean Hospitals,” New York 
Times, June 8, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/world/asia/mers-viruss-path-one-man-many-
south-korean-hospitals.html. 
110 “MERS Outbreak in the Republic of Korea, 2015,” World Health Organization, accessed June 3, 
2019, https://www.who.int/westernpacific/emergencies/2015-mers-outbreak. 
111 Anna Fitfield, “South Korea Quarantines More than 1,300 in Race against MERS,” Washington 
Post, June 3, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/south-korea-scrambles-to-try-to-
contain-mers-outbreak/2015/06/03/589c19f6-236b-48f6-b4ea-
ee3aa7ad66b5_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a8d0ccabdac8. 
112 Choe Sang-Hun, “After MERS, South Korea Authorizes Prison for Quarantine Scofflaws,” New 
York Times, June 26, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/world/asia/after-mers-south-korea-
authorizes-prison-for-quarantine-scofflaws.html. 
113 Danny Lee and Jennifer Ngo, “Punish Travelers Who Lie about Their Health, SARS Expert 
Urges,” South China Morning Post, May 30, 2015, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/health-
environment/article/1813158/two-south-koreans-who-refused-mers-quarantine. 
114 Reuters, “South Korea to Track Mobile Phones to Enforce Mers Virus Quarantine Rules,” The 




The practice of hospital shopping, seeking care from multiple health care providers, 
contributed to the outbreak as Koreans spread the disease from hospital to hospital. The 
South Korean government instituted restrictive public health measures aimed at ending the 
spread of MERS-CoV, but research studies indicate that those measures did not play a 
substantial role in ending the outbreak. The WHO reported: 
In view of the current evidence of limited human-to-human transmission of 
MERS-CoV and, in particular, the lack of evidence that the disease is 
transmissible in the pre-symptomatic or early symptomatic stages, neither 
quarantine nor isolation of asymptomatic contacts seems necessary at this 
time.115 
The CDC reports MERS-CoV is typically spread by patients in hospitals and is not 
typically seen in the community.116 Nevertheless, the South Korean government 
responded to this crisis by strengthening its quarantine enforcement law.117  
In addition, the South Korean Center for Disease Control (KCDC) chose to 
disregard the crisis communication recommendations from the WHO that included ways 
to gain the public’s trust by providing early communication and ensuring operations were 
conducted transparently.118 Moreover, to avoid causing panic and hysteria, government 
officials refused to name the hospitals with the highest MERS-CoV infection rates, which 
compounded matters. Andrew Jack of the Financial Times reports that this refusal occurred 
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due to a “longstanding culture of secrecy as well as to the desire to save face and preserve 
reputations.”119 
The public health measures ordered by the South Korean government did not help 
stop the spread of disease and the evidenced-based practices suggested by the WHO were 
ignored. The South Korean healthcare system was overwhelmed and could not effectively 
respond. Furthermore, South Korea’s healthcare system contributed to the spread of the 
disease because of a lack of preparedness for medical emergencies.120 This study finds that 
forced quarantine did not have any measurable effect on stopping the spread of the MERS-
CoV disease in South Korea.  
c. Community Support 
Some South Koreans placed under quarantine suspected that other well-connected 
patients were flouting the quarantine laws. Some of these citizens disregarded the forced 
quarantine orders and one quarantined person took a commercial flight to China.121 The 
law was changed to impose stricter penalties for those found in non-compliance with forced 
quarantine orders. The KCDC did not follow the WHO’s instructions to win the public’s 
trust by telling South Koreans what they could do to protect themselves.122 Instead, forced 
quarantine was imposed; ultimately, it was not a factor that caused the end of the epidemic. 
The use of forced quarantine receives a low score in the assessment of community support 
because of non-compliance and the addition of stricter penalties to the quarantine 
enforcement law.  
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d. Cost 
During the peak of the MERS-CoV outbreak, the South Korean government 
ordered the closure of schools and canceled public events. South Korean tourism declined 
during the outbreak that caused an estimated loss of 10 billion U.S. dollars.123  
The assessment score of the costs incurred as a result of the 2015 MERS-CoV outbreak 
rates low based on the number of fatalities and the substantial financial cost sustained by 
South Korea.  
e. Implementation Ease  
The South Korean government did not adhere to the recommendations of the WHO 
and CDC in regard to the application of forced quarantine. Instead, the laws governing 
quarantine enforcement were strengthened and the penalties for non-compliance were 
increased. Quarantined South Koreans found to have violated public health orders faced 
fines and jail time.  
The assessment score for the ease of implementation is high based on the short 
amount of time it took the government to strengthen its quarantine enforcement laws. It 
should be noted that the adjustment to the quarantine laws did not take into account the 
unnecessary quarantine of patients and the loss of privacy incurred by South Koreans. 
Although the implementation score is high, it did not translate into an effective measure 
that ended the epidemic. See Table 3 for a summary of the assessment scores of the MERS-
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Table 3. MERS-CoV—Republic of Korea Forced Quarantine Summary 
Table with Assessment Scores 
MERS-CoV—Republic of Korea 
(2015) 
Grade 
(1 low to 5 high) 
Effectiveness 1 
Community Support 2 
Cost 1 
Implementation Ease 4 
 
B. SELF-QUARANTINE 
The self-quarantine policies employed during the 2003 SARS outbreak in Canada 
and the 1976 Ebola epidemic in Zaire are assessed to determine whether these policies can 
be implemented by law enforcement in the United States. The two self-quarantine episodes 
included policies that directed affected citizens to isolate themselves from family, friends, 
and co-workers. These two episodes featured public health orders that directed citizens to 
maintain a safe distance from others and involved geographic or social constrictions that 
created a self-quarantine environment.  
1. SARS—Canada (2003) 
The 2003 SARS outbreak in Canada had two distinct phases. The first phase 
commenced after travelers returned from Hong Kong and sought medical treatment for 
respiratory symptoms. Once some of the individuals were admitted to the hospital, 
nosocomial infections occurred primarily in healthcare workers who were unaware of the 
patient’s illness. As noted previously, a nosocomial infection occurs when a patient is 
infected while hospitalized, instead of contracting a disease in the community.124 In late 
March 2003, as more Canadians contracted the disease, the government responded by 
designating SARS as a reportable disease under its Health Protection and Promotion Act. 
This legislation permits public health policymakers to issue quarantine orders and 
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document the information of patients as they are diagnosed.125 The Ontario provincial 
government declared a medical emergency related to SARS on March 26, 2003. By May 
2003, the WHO determined that the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) was no longer 
experiencing newly acquired SARS cases.126 The Ontario provincial government declared 
that the medical emergency had concluded on May 17, 2003.127 
As the medical emergency was declared under control, the regional hospital 
requirements pertaining to SARS precautions ceased. A cluster of patients at an orthopedic 
hospital, however, developed respiratory symptoms and it was later determined that they 
contracted the disease during their hospital stay. This grouping of cases was determined to 
be nosocomial in nature because the patients became ill because of a lapse in SARS 
infection control procedures in the hospital where they were being treated. The lapse in 
SARS precautions at the conclusion of the first phase is believed to be the cause for the 
second wave of SARS cases.128  
a. Policy 
During the 2003 SARS epidemic in Canada, the government directed affected 
citizens to self-quarantine. According to Julian Fantino, former chief of the TPS during the 
SARS epidemic, most of the people affected by quarantine orders complied voluntarily.129 
The self-quarantine orders were considered successful because people perceived the 
process as fair, and all the relevant stakeholders could successfully communicate with each 
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other.130 The success of self-quarantine in this instance did not rely on law enforcement to 
compel communicable disease patients to comply. True, the infection control measures 
implemented at area hospitals during the first phase of the outbreak were ended 
prematurely, which resulted in a second outbreak of SARS. Reimplementation of the public 
health measures, to include continued compliance with self-quarantine orders, assisted in 
ending the 2003 SARS outbreak in Canada.  
b. Effectiveness 
Coherent, consistent, and easily accessible information provided by public health 
departments and other government agencies helped allay fears among quarantined patients 
in Canada. In a research study conducted by Emma Robertson et al., these patients 
described the loss and conflict they experienced during their quarantine periods, and their 
fear and frustration at being quarantined because of a communicable disease contracted 
through no fault of their own.131 The patients reported a loss of income and social isolation 
from others as the most significant obstacles to being compliant with quarantine orders. 
Drawing similar conclusions, Sarbjit S. Johal notes that distress and fear of quarantined 
patients can occur if government organizations and infection control experts provide poor 
communication and information.132 Johal advocates for a “transparent and credible public 
information strategy” as the best method to prevent widespread panic and fear in the 
affected communities.133  
The Canadian government took several steps to ease the impact of the quarantine 
on affected citizens. The federal two-week waiting period required before unemployment 
benefits could be received in Canada was waived. Steps were taken to ensure food, water, 
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and communication were provided to quarantined Canadians because, during a 
communicable disease event, the requirements of daily life do not cease. Both government 
and non-government agencies assisted citizens in need. The self-quarantine policy 
instituted by the Canadian government is determined to be effective because the measures 
taken provided economic and social support to affected citizens.  
c. Community Support 
As noted previously, research revealed that the psychological isolation of 
quarantine and a lack of timely communication could lead to non-compliance with 
quarantine orders. In a survey conducted by Dr. Laura Hawryluck et al., the researchers 
contacted over 15,000 Canadians who were self-quarantined and encouraged to participate 
in this survey through media releases and televised interviews of the research staff.  
One of the methods to measure the support of the community is the lack of a law 
enforcement response required to enforce self-quarantine orders. During the 2003 SARS 
epidemic in the GTA, Canadians voluntarily complied with self-quarantine policies, and 
consequentially, police officers were not needed to make very many arrests. The 
community’s support for the self-quarantine plan rates as high due to the few arrests for 
non-compliance. Instead, the Canadian model of self-quarantine during the 2003 SARS 
epidemic primarily used law enforcement to make periodic checks on affected citizens.134 
The adaptation of a less restrictive self-quarantine enforcement policy yielded positive 
results. This method should be considered when developing U.S. law enforcement 
strategies to carry out self-quarantine orders in the future. 
d. Cost 
The 2003 SARS outbreak in Canada resulted in 44 deaths and over 400 people were 
infected.135 The Canadian tourism industry was negatively affected and Air Canada was 
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forced to cut back on scheduled flights due to the fear and panic caused by the outbreak.136 
The Ontario government enacted a plan that entailed spending over 300 million Canadian 
dollars to cover the lost wages of healthcare workers.137 The Ontario local government 
provided food to affected citizens.138 The Canadian Red Cross mobilized hundreds of 
volunteers to deliver food, water, and medical supplies and provided healthcare 
information to affected citizens.139 The cost of these supplies was absorbed by the 
participating organizations. As noted, the high compliance rate with self-quarantine 
resulted in Canadian law enforcement not being required to take an active role during this 
crisis. As a result, additional police staffing and overtime costs were not required. While 
the government did subsidize the salaries of affected healthcare workers, this action was 
seen as a direct measure that assisted quarantine compliance. Although the Canadian 
tourism industry was negatively impacted, events were later planned to encourage people 
to return.140 The evaluation of cost during this episode of self-quarantine receives high 
scores.  
e. Implementation Ease 
The law enforcement component of the self-quarantine policy used during the 2003 
SARS epidemic was implemented without significant negative issues. The evaluation of 
implementation ease therefore receives an elevated score. The TPS recognized the need to 
train and equip police officers to enforce quarantine orders safely. TPS police officers were 
prepared to locate non-compliant citizens and transport them to the hospital named in the 
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quarantine order and then detain them until the order lapsed.141 The assessment of the ease 
of implementation also takes into account the lack of law enforcement assistance to compel 
Canadians to comply with self-quarantine orders. Table 4 presents a summary of the 
assessment scores of the SARS—Canada self-quarantine policy. 
Table 4. SARS—Canada Self-quarantine Summary Table  
with Assessment Scores 
SARS—Canada (2003) Grade (1 low to 5 high) 
Effectiveness 4 
Community Support 4 
Cost 4 
Implementation Ease 4 
 
2. Ebola—Zaire (1976) 
The EVD is a hemorrhagic disease first discovered in people living in a small 
village called Yambuku, near the Ebola River in Zaire (later renamed the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) in 1976. The origin of EVD is unknown; however, the CDC posits 
that bats originally transmitted it to humans and non-human primates.142 EVD patients are 
contagious when they are symptomatic, and the virus spreads when contaminated bodily 
fluids come into contact with broken skin or the mucous membranes of another person, as 
well as through unprotected sexual contact.143 EVD is an often-deadly disease and its 
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symptoms, which may appear up to 21 days after exposure, include nausea, vomiting, 
diarrhea, and unexplained bleeding.144 
Care of the EVD patient focuses on alleviating pain, replenishing lost fluids, and 
treating other infections if they occur. Currently, no FDA-approved vaccination is available 
for the treatment of EVD although clinical trials are currently being conducted.145 The use 
of contaminated needles at a local hospital along with the consumption of animals infected 
with the virus (bushmeat) caused the outbreak of Ebola in 1976, and it spread via traditional 
funeral rituals involving the washing and cleaning of the bodies of deceased victims.146  
a. Policy 
The outbreak affected only an area near a remote village, and after determining that 
a primary cause was healthcare workers using improperly sterilized hypodermic needles, 
the suspect hospital was closed. The policy used was to flood the affected area with 
resources, use quarantine, and educate the population about EVD, and it ended this 
outbreak. The local citizens also received information concerning the transmission of 
EVD.147 The settlement’s isolation also played a significant role in preventing the further 
spread of EVD.148  
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b. Effectiveness  
In Zaire, 318 EVD cases were reported during the 1976 outbreak. Of this number, 
88 percent of these cases were fatal (280 patients).149 During this initial outbreak of Ebola, 
compliance with self-quarantine prevented the disease from being transported to larger 
urban cities. Compared to the multiple Ebola outbreaks that have occurred since, the 
utilization of self-quarantine policies during this episode saved thousands of lives. While 
the cost in lives was high in the small villages near Yambuku, self-quarantine stopped the 
spread of Ebola to the rest of Zaire. The 1976 Ebola outbreak in Zaire lasted just 11 
weeks.150 The assessment of self-quarantine in Zaire during the 1976 outbreak results in 
an elevated grade for effectiveness.  
c. Community Support 
According to Dr. Peter Piot, one of the microbiologists credited with the discovery 
of EVD in Zaire, community support was an essential component that helped stop this 
communicable disease outbreak. Piot stated at the time:  
getting the message out into the community and getting people to change 
their behavior is critical if we are to bring the current outbreak under 
control. Measures such as isolating patients, contact tracing and follow-up 
surveillance, and community education are all part of the response.151 
In a research study published by the WHO in 1978, significant factors were 
identified as hastening the end of this epidemic, the decision to stop using contaminated 
hypodermic needles and the use of quarantine both contributed to the end of this 
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outbreak.152 The high compliance rate with orders to self-quarantine produces a 
correspondingly high assessment score for this factor. 
d. Cost  
Due to the remote location of the village, the government of Zaire used military 
aircraft to shuttle people and supplies to the villages surrounding Yambuku.153 Mobuto 
Sese Seko ruled Zaire from 1965 until 1996; he was a corrupt leader who squandered the 
country’s vast resources.154 As a result, the dysfunctional Zairean government was unable 
to resolve this medical crisis without international support. Zaire relied on the assistance 
of the WHO and CDC along with several countries to stop the first outbreak of Ebola, to 
include the United States, Canada, South Africa, Belgium, and France.155 The assessment 
of cost to Zaire during this communicable disease event is elevated although other 
participating countries and agencies absorbed the cost. 
e. Implementation Ease 
Doctor Joel Breman of the American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 
was on a team that responded to the 1976 Ebola outbreak. Breman points to the ability of 
the team to work “harmoniously in laboratories and with local communities” and how that 
“was essential for rapid success in 1976.”156 The self-quarantine policy was easily 
implemented and directly contributed to the disease not being spread from the area. The 
policy receives an elevated grade for the ease of implementation, although it should be 
noted that some of the conditions that contributed to the success of the self-quarantine no 
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longer exist. For example, the current EVD outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo has been marred by community distrust that is negatively affecting efforts to control 
the epidemic.157 Table 5 shows a summary of the assessment scores of the Ebola—Zaire 
self-quarantine policy.  
Table 5. Ebola—Zaire Self-quarantine Summary Table  
with Assessment Scores 
Ebola—Zaire (1976) Grade (1 low to 5 high) 
Effectiveness 4 
Community Support 4 
Cost 4 
Implementation Ease 4 
 
C. HYBRID MODELS 
Some examples of hybrid quarantine enforcement policies occurred after forced 
and self-quarantine policies were tried and failed. In China during 2003, the quarantine 
policy was changed from forced to hybrid. This change occurred due to the failure of forced 
quarantine. Hybrid quarantine enforcement policies typically utilize components of forced 
and self-quarantine policies. The following case studies are considered hybrid quarantine 
enforcement policies because either significant changes were made to the original plan or 
no mandated uniform quarantine enforcement plan ever was implemented during the 
course of the communicable disease event.  
1. SARS—People’s Republic of China (2003) after Forced Quarantine 
Failure 
The Chinese government initially relied on withholding information from the 
public and public health organizations in other countries about the spread of SARS. To 
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prevent Chinese citizens from receiving information about SARS, the government blocked 
newscasts from other countries when information about the SARS outbreak was 
discussed.158 An admission by Deputy Health Minister Gao Qiang was one of the first 
acknowledgments of the SARS outbreak by the Chinese government.159 Officials from the 
WHO expressed disbelief concerning the low number of SARS cases, especially since 
cases in other countries occurred after people arrived from China.160 On April 20, 2003, 
the mayor of Beijing and the health minister were removed from office and the Chinese 
government reported several hundred cases of SARS; just a week earlier, only 22 cases of 
SARS were reported.161 The release of factual information did not occur until the WHO 
intervened. The lack of information provided to the public by the Chinese government also 
gave a false sense of security that the outbreak had subsided.  
a. Policy 
By early 2004, the Chinese government changed its approach to quarantine. Rather 
than enforcing a broad quarantine that restricted the movement of hundreds of people, it 
focused exclusively on the 81 contacts identified by the first SARS patient.162 This 
approach appears to have been more successful; according to Julie Hall, the 
Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response Coordinator for China at the WHO 
at the time, “The system of identification and contact-tracing seems to be working.”163 
This approach quarantined fewer people and focused more on the surveillance of patients 
in their homes, not government facilities. The Chinese political system has been described 
as fragmented authoritarianism and can lead to exasperatingly slow changes in public 
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policies.164 As such, the Chinese government’s decision to use an evidence-based 
approach to ending the SARS outbreak instead of using forced quarantine policies occurred 
slowly.  
Officials from the WHO were invited to China to investigate the SARS outbreak, 
but they were not permitted to travel to the Guangdong province until eight days after they 
arrived.165 WHO officials held discussions with Chinese authorities to express their 
concerns and convey the importance of “case reporting and contact tracing.”166 Update 
#27 issued by the WHO outlined issues and steps to be taken by the Chinese government. 
Notably, public health officials began to convey the “need to manage patients according to 
the principles of isolation and strict infection control.”167 The intervention by the WHO 
can be seen as a turning point in the fight against the spread of SARS in China.  
b. Effectiveness 
The Chinese government changed its position after negotiations with officials from 
the WHO convinced them of the need for an evidence-based approach to stop the spread 
of SARS. Due to early missteps by local public officials and the nature of the political 
system entrenched in China, controlling SARS took over a year.168 As noted, the focus on 
stopping the spread of SARS eventually included providing timely and accurate 
information to the public, surveilling new cases by contact tracing, and the use of 
quarantine enforcement when deemed medically necessary. The policy adopted by the 
Chinese government was eventually effective and the WHO declared the outbreak to be 
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under control on June 4, 2003.169 Chinese citizens quarantined during this phase were 
quarantined for sound medical reasons, as opposed to the policy of forced quarantine used 
earlier. The assessment of the effectiveness of the policy changes receives a high grade 
because of the focus on the use of evidence-based measures and the use of quarantine only 
on an as needed, not mass, basis.  
c. Community Support 
Chinese citizens greatly distrust their government. As such, citizens circumvented 
early attempts to stop the news of this outbreak by texting each other and posting contrary 
information on internet chat rooms.170 Despite this distrust, the WHO suggested the 
Chinese government hold daily press conferences to keep citizens notified.  
Near the end of the SARS outbreak in China, a cluster of SARS cases occurred 
because of a security lapse involving scientists conducting tests.171 One of the scientists 
suspected of the biosecurity breach took public rail transportation throughout China en 
route to her home. As a result, the Chinese government quarantined over 500 people. 
Unlike previous quarantine orders, the WHO noted:  
[t]o date, all diagnosed cases and cases under investigation have been linked 
to chains of transmission involving close personal contact with an identified 
case. There is no evidence of wider transmission in the community.172  
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Additionally, to stop the spread of SARS during the May Day holiday in 2004, the 
Chinese government provided citizens with information about the security lapse and 
curtailed the holiday known as Golden Week to only three days.173  
The community support for the government actions is difficult to gauge. Fear 
caused by the epidemic compounded by the distrust of the government may have caused 
people to comply. The public health information eventually released by government 
officials helped assuage some of the fears caused by the outbreak and contributed to a 
higher level of compliance. The low score for this factor takes into account the actions 
taken to end this outbreak, but it should also be noted the Chinese government did not 
necessarily take these actions to seek out community support. The limited use of quarantine 
was based on the recommendations of the WHO and not an attempt to gain the support of 
Chinese citizens.  
d. Cost 
With the eventual adoption of the methods suggested by the WHO, the SARS 
outbreak eventually was declared under control. At the time, it was expected that an 
extended SARS outbreak would cause an undue economic burden on China.174 Due in part 
to the quick resolution of the epidemic, the Chinese economy quickly recovered from the 
economic crisis brought on by the SARS epidemic.175 The assessment of the cost in this 
hybrid quarantine episode is elevated because the methods implemented were instrumental 
in stopping the spread of disease and ending the economic downturn. 
 
173 AP, “China Quarantines Hundreds to Halt SARS,” MSNBC, April 26, 2004, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4806051/ns/health-infectious_diseases/t/china-quarantines-hundreds-halt-
sars/; Xiaohong Xu, “Impact of SARS on China,” Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International 
Relations (Summer/Fall 2003): 47, http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/archives/06_xu.pdf. 
174 Keith Bradsher, “The SARS Epidemic: Economy; Outbreak of Disease Brings Big Drop-Off in 
China’s Economy,” New York Times, April 28, 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/28/world/sars-
epidemic-economy-outbreak-disease-brings-big-drop-off-china-s-economy.html. 
175 Marcus Richard Keogh-Brown and Richard David Smith, “The Economic Impact of SARS: How 
Does the Reality Match the Predictions?” Health Policy 88, no. 1 (October 1, 2008): 110–20, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2008.03.003. 
58 
e. Implementation Ease 
The involvement of the WHO and the worldwide panic caused by the outbreak 
prompted the implementation of hybrid policy changes in China. The WHO afforded the 
Chinese government greater legitimacy to its citizens than it may have had prior to the 
outbreak. Chinese citizens were receiving almost no information about the SARS outbreak 
prior to WHO involvement; the hybrid policy change resulted in daily press conferences 
and officials were held responsible for mistakes. For example, the chief scientist 
responsible for the SARS biosecurity breach was publicly dismissed from his position.176 
In addition, the policy changes resulted in fewer citizens being forced into quarantine. The 
policy changes contributed to reducing intrusions on the civil liberties of Chinese citizens 
while still ending this communicable disease event. 
The bureaucracy of the Chinese government caused the slow implementation of the 
policy changes recommended by the WHO. Government resistance to employing such 
changes immediately is the cause for a decreased implementation score. See Table 6 for a 
summary of the assessment scores of the SARS—People’s Republic of China hybrid 
quarantine policy. 
Table 6. SARS—People’s Republic of China Hybrid Model Summary 
Table with Assessment Scores 
SARS—People’s Republic of 
China (2003) 
Grade 
(1 low to 5 high) 
Effectiveness 4 
Community Support 2 
Cost 4 
Implementation Ease 3 
 
 
176 Lei Du and Martin Enserink, “SARS Crisis Topples China Lab Chief,” Science, American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, July 2, 2004, 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2004/07/sars-crisis-topples-china-lab-chief. 
59 
2. Ebola—United States of America (2014) 
The 2014 EVD outbreak in the United States occurred after Thomas Duncan, a 
native of Liberia, took a commercial flight to Dallas, Texas, to visit family. On September 
25, 2014, Duncan arrived at the Emergency Department of Texas Health Presbyterian 
Hospital complaining of abdominal pain and a temperature of 103.1 F. After determining 
his condition not to be severe and perhaps not being informed about his recent travel from 
Liberia, the treating physician discharged him.177 Duncan returned to the hospital on 
September 28 after his condition worsened. Duncan was eventually admitted to the 
intensive care unit, and on September 30, the CDC confirmed Duncan’s EVD diagnosis.178 
Whether the hospital staff knew he was contagious or had the proper equipment and 
training to care for Duncan adequately is somewhat unclear.179 Two nurses who provided 
care to Duncan contracted EVD. On October 8, Duncan succumbed to the illness.180 
Duncan’s death and the EVD diagnosis of the two nurses who cared for him prompted 
nationwide panic and hysteria.  
In 2014, Donald Trump had not yet announced his intention to run in the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election, but was already a very outspoken public figure. Trump tweeted that 
healthcare workers volunteering in West Africa were “great;” however, he then went on to 
tweet that they also must “suffer the consequences” if they become infected with EVD.181 
The next day, he tweeted, “The U.S. must immediately stop all flights from EBOLA 
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infected countries or the plague will start and spread inside our ‘borders’. Act fast!”182 The 
series of tweets contributed to the fear and hysteria at the time without providing any sound 
medical advice. Overreaction by such a controversial figure garnered headlines and may 
have been used to attract support for the upcoming election.183 As this example shows, the 
information that pervades the public forum concerning disease outbreaks does not always 
come from credible sources and can unnecessarily cause fear and panic.  
a. Policy 
U.S. law enforcement gained unexpected experience in enforcing quarantine orders 
in 2014, but the experiences varied from state to state. The State of Texas sought to 
quarantine four people and monitor approximately 100 others in reference to the Duncan 
case.184 Additionally, a guard was stationed outside Duncan’s hospital room while local 
law enforcement enforced quarantine at the apartment complex where he was staying.185 
Governors of other states enacted quarantine orders that were even more restrictive than 
CDC quarantine guidelines for EVD. For example, when he enacted the most restrictive 
quarantine and isolation laws in the United States, Connecticut’s then-Governor Daniel 
Malloy decided he needed to “go above and beyond what the CDC is recommending.”186 
At times, elected officials called for restrictive and varying versions of quarantine that 
required U.S. law enforcement to adapt.  
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Some states mandated forced quarantine orders for people exposed to 
communicable diseases, but the restrictions of the orders were subject to change. New 
Jersey’s then-Governor Chris Christie enacted a 21-day quarantine for people returning 
from countries suffering from the EVD epidemic.187 Kaci Hickox, a returning registered 
nurse who had worked with Doctors without Borders/Médecins sans frontières (MSF) 
treating patients in Sierra Leone, was quarantined under guard in a New Jersey hospital, 
then parking lot, until being released to her home state of Maine. Hickox never experienced 
any EVD symptoms and never tested positive for the virus. Hickox later obtained a court 
order to permit her the freedom to leave her house, but still had to consent to periodic 
testing for EVD during the incubation period. Hickox defied the conditions of her 
quarantine and filed a legal challenge to it.188 The legal challenge posed by Hickox 
reaffirms the requirement for quarantine orders to be imposed only out of medical 
necessity. In 1900, the city of San Francisco experienced an outbreak of bubonic plague.189 
In the landmark case of Jew Ho vs. Williamson, it was determined that the implementation 
of forced quarantine needs to be based on medical necessity and not used arbitrarily.190  
Other states relied on exposed people to self-quarantine. For example, Dr. Craig 
Spencer returned to the United States in October 2014 from treating EVD patients in 
Guinea. When he returned, Dr. Spencer was asymptomatic and went about his daily 
activities in New York City, where he was staying with his fiancée. When Dr. Spencer 
noticed he had a fever of 100.3 Fahrenheit, he presented himself to Bellevue Hospital 
where he was tested and treated for EVD.191 Additionally, Dr. Spencer’s fiancée self-
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quarantined herself in their NYC apartment.192 During his stay at Bellevue Hospital, Dr. 
Spencer was vilified in the media for being careless and possibly exposing unsuspecting 
people to EVD by using New York City mass transit, eating at a restaurant, and visiting a 
bowling alley.  
b. Effectiveness 
The effectiveness assessment of the hybrid quarantine orders imposed during this 
communicable disease outbreak receives a high score, but factors directly related to the 
political climate and disease characteristics also contribute to this assessment. Once 
released from forced quarantine in New Jersey, Hickox went home to Maine and openly 
defied her quarantine order.193 The panic created by EVD in the United States was short-
lived; only the two nurses in Texas contracted EVD and both recovered from the illness 
without infecting others. In this light, the effectiveness of the ad-hoc quarantine policies is 
high, but whether quarantine played a notable role to end this disease outbreak remains 
unknown. 
c. Community Support 
The panic and hysteria that surrounded the event affected the community support 
for quarantine. Politicians and celebrities called for stopping flights from West Africa and 
the quarantine of returning healthcare workers.194 This situation resulted despite the fact 
that asymptomatic patients cannot spread EVD.195 While the assessment score of 
community support during this disease outbreak is high, traditional media and social media 
sources dispersed incorrect information and rumors that encouraged acceptance of over-
arching and medically unnecessary public health orders. If faced with similar 
 
192 “Timeline: Tracking NYC Ebola Patient’s Whereabouts,” NBC New York, October 24, 2014, 
http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Ebola-Craig-Spencer-Timeline-Visit-Track-New-York-Health-
Department-280342252.html. 
193 Brady, “Nurse Kaci Hickox Takes a Bike Ride, Defying Maine’s Quarantine.” 
194 Jaime Fuller, “The Ebola Travel Ban Is Really Politically Popular. Here’s Why It’s Not 
Happening,” Washington Post, October 20, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2014/10/20/the-ebola-travel-ban-is-really-popular-heres-why-its-not-happening/. 
195 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Transmission: Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever.”  
63 
circumstances in the future, community support for quarantine orders may not achieve its 
intended goals.  
d. Cost 
The cost assessment of this communicable disease outbreak includes two distinct 
factors. The first factor is that few U.S. citizens contracted EVD in the 2014 outbreak. Only 
11 people in the United States received treatment for EVD and only two of those people 
contracted the disease within its borders.196 The second factor is that the 2014 EVD 
outbreak in the United States was short-lived and very few people were actually placed in 
quarantine.197 This assessment considers these two mitigating factors that affected the 
financial costs of this outbreak; these factors may not occur, however, during the next 
communicable disease event in the United States. 
e. Implementation Ease 
After an informal, and at times, medically unsound assessment by government 
leaders and political candidates preparing for upcoming elections, people were 
quarantined, which prompted the enforcement of quarantine orders by law enforcement. 
The manner in which these quarantine enforcement orders were enacted, however, made 
implementation difficult. Although residents in the apartment complex where Thomas 
Duncan stayed had to maintain compliance, Kaci Hickox obtained a court order that lifted 
her quarantine status in New Jersey. Once back home in Maine, Hickox defied a quarantine 
order to remain inside her home. The various public health orders created a hybrid 
quarantine enforcement plan because they relied on facets of forced and self-quarantine 
orders. An assessment of the implementation of quarantine orders yields a low score 
because conflicting public health orders were issued and not uniformly applied. Refer to 
Table 7 for a summary of the assessment scores of the Ebola—United States hybrid 
quarantine policy. 
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Table 7. Ebola–United States Hybrid Model Summary Table  
with Assessment Scores 
Ebola—United States (2014) Grade (1 low to 5 high) 
Effectiveness 4 
Community Support 4 
Cost 3 
Implementation Ease 2 
 
3. Ebola—The Democratic Republic of the Congo (2018) 
On August 8, 2018, the Ministry of Health of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) sent a report to the WHO about a cluster of Ebola patients being treated in the North 
Kivu region of the country. Since this outbreak was declared by the DRC, additional cases 
have occurred in the South Kivu and Ituri provinces of the country.198 This latest episode 
of EVD has brought with it additional challenges that will need to be addressed. 
Since the 1960s, civil wars have ravaged the DRC and although the latest civil war 
ended in 2003, conflicts between rival rebel groups continue. An estimated four million 
people have been displaced in the DRC because of continued rebel fighting. Approximately 
400,000 people have immigrated to the DRC from neighboring South Sudan, Burundi, and 
the Central African Republic because of internal strife in the region.199 This current 
episode of EVD could pose logistical challenges to the organizations committed to 
stopping the outbreak. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), although this current EVD outbreak has not reached refugee settlements or 
internal displacement sites yet, refugees and displaced persons are at a higher risk for EVD 
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because they have limited access to clean water and medicine.200 According to the CDC, 
the DRC has experienced 10 EVD outbreaks since the discovery of the disease.201 
a. Policy 
The policy utilized in the DRC is a hybrid quarantine policy due to the use of both 
forced and self-quarantine orders. Additionally, a vaccine to prevent EVD has shown 
efficacy and is being used during the latest outbreak in the DRC.202 Although the 
international community has responded to assist the DRC to resolve this EVD outbreak, 
civil unrest in neighboring Uganda continues to threaten the safety of the at-risk 
populations residing in the DRC. Healthcare workers and security personnel deployed to 
the area are also at risk of being attacked. Medical and security staff continue to report 
being assaulted by rebel gangs. Due to the civil wars and ongoing feuding among gangs 
that persists, DRC citizens have expressed a palpable mistrust of people in power, which 
also includes healthcare workers and security staff.203 Rebels attacked an EVD treatment 
center operated by the MSF and burned the building to the ground. According to the MSF 
general director in North Kivu, Meine Nicolai, the:  
reasons behind the attack are unclear and such violence is unacceptable, 
what we know is that the actors of the Ebola response—MSF included—
have failed to gain the trust of a significant part of the population … [and] 
… all those involved in this response must change their approach and truly 
engage with the grievances and fears of the communities.204 
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The current plan to stop the spread of the disease has had uneven results. 
Components of the current plan to stop the spread of Ebola in the DRC and neighboring 
countries have shown to be effective, at times. During this latest outbreak, a new vaccine 
has shown promise and the international community has responded to assist war-torn DRC. 
Despite these positive aspects to the response plan, the DRC, MSF, and other organizations 
have experienced setbacks. Besides the EVD treatment center being destroyed in February 
2019, family members took three forced quarantine patients from the port city of Mbandaka 
from the MSF facility to attend a prayer service. Dr. Jean-Clement Cabrol, emergency 
medical coordinator for the MSF, told the UK Independent: “the escape was organised by 
the families, with six motorcycles as the patients were very ill and couldn’t walk.”205 The 
effectiveness assessment results in a lower score because although a sound medical plan to 
end this outbreak appears to be in place, the plan is not being fully utilized.  
c. Community Support 
The plan to end the latest outbreak of EVD in the DRC has limited community 
support. Community disengagement resulting from years of distrust of authority along with 
ongoing fighting are the primary reasons this outbreak continues. Violent attacks have been 
launched against hospitals and while some DRC citizens have been non-compliant with 
quarantine orders, others have taken heed of the sound medical advice being provided. In 
July 2019, doctors in South Kivu convinced 15 people to comply with quarantine orders at 
a local hospital.206 Much like the effectiveness assessment, the community support 
component of this analysis receives a lower score because of the widespread violence and 
non-compliance with quarantine orders.  
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The costs for the plan to stop the latest EVD outbreak are high, regardless of how 
this situation is measured. Multiple governments and non-government organizations 
(NGOs) have contributed manpower, equipment, and funding to end this latest outbreak. 
In July 2019, the World Bank announced that it had mobilized $300 billion U.S. dollars to 
finance the latest DRC Ebola epidemic.207 The WHO estimates that it will need an 
additional $324 million in funding to continue its response and recovery operations.208 
Many of the conditions that have led to the previous 10 outbreaks in the region are still in 
place, and in some cases, the conditions are worse. The current EVD outbreak has not only 
involved small villages, but has now also encroached into a large urban DRC city.209 The 
cost analysis for the 2018 EVD outbreak in the DRC receives a low grade and will continue 
to do so for the foreseeable future. 
e. Implementation Ease 
Both self-quarantine and forced quarantine have been used in the DRC during past 
outbreaks, with mixed results. Although the region has experienced self-quarantine and 
forced quarantine orders previously, factors inherent to the region have caused the hybrid 
plan to experience difficulties in its implementation and results in a low score in this 
assessment. The ongoing civil war in Uganda, the large number of displaced persons, and 
an innate distrust of authority by the community have made the implementation of the plan 
markedly difficult. The takeaway from this EVD outbreak should be not to underestimate 
the unwillingness of some members of the community to cooperate with public health 
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orders if a previous history of mistrust and mistreatment by local government 
representatives predates the outbreak, which could affect public health and law 
enforcement. Table 8 displays a summary of the assessment scores of the Ebola—The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo hybrid quarantine policy. 
Table 8. Ebola–The Democratic Republic of the Congo Hybrid Model 
Summary Table with Assessment Scores 
Ebola—The Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (2018) 
Grade 
(1 low to 5 high) 
Effectiveness 2 
Community Support 2 
Cost 2 
Implementation Ease 3 
 
D. QUARANTINE PLAN ASSESSMENTS 
The case studies about the use of forced quarantine, self-quarantine, and hybrid 
models provide information that can be used to formulate quarantine policies in the United 
States. Although the case studies provide some evidence and statistics, not all of the data 
is relevant to U.S. law enforcement. For example, China’s plan to control the spread of 
SARS in 2003 began with draconian measures to stop the spread of disease. Some of the 
methods used in China could not legally be applied in this country. Likewise, the isolating 
conditions that prevailed during the self-quarantine event that occurred in Zaire in 1976 
could not easily be replicated in the United States. Regardless of practicality, the 
assessment of the policies yields experiences and evidence that can be used to construct a 
quarantine enforcement plan that can be implemented by U.S. law enforcement.  
1. Forced Quarantine Assessment 
Forced quarantine policies may not be feasible to introduce or enforce in the United 
States, but important lessons can be learned from their attempted implementation. The 
early response to the 2003 SARS epidemic in China involved the forced quarantine of 
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hundreds of people and the withholding of public health information. The South Korean 
government instituted increased fines and authorized arrests for forced quarantine non-
compliance, but these methods did not prove to be successful in ending the MERS-CoV 
outbreak in 2015. Both case studies illuminate the need to have an evidenced-based 
approach to using quarantine to stop the spread of disease.  
These two cases are similar in that the civil liberties of these citizens were not 
considered when the policies were adopted. While the governments of China and South 
Korea were not directly concerned about violating the rights of its citizens, the U.S. 
government, if placed in a similar predicament, would be required to heed these 
considerations. Suspending constitutional protections for U.S. citizens would have to be 
deliberated prior to the implementation of a forced quarantine policy. The decision to 
suspend constitutional protections, even in the event of a threat to public safety, will 
assuredly face legal challenge.  
During the 2015 MERS-CoV event in South Korea, citizens reverted to a tactic 
called hospital shopping. South Korean citizens visited multiple hospitals in an effort to 
receive better quality medical treatment. This practice led South Koreans to spread the 
disease further. This phenomenon could occur in the United States. To combat this issue, 
citizens will have to be reassured that they are receiving appropriate medical care, 
regardless of where the medical care is sought. While this issue might not be within the 
scope of law enforcement to address, this unexpected issue caused quarantine non-
compliance in the case study countries. A U.S. law enforcement quarantine policy should 
anticipate such factors that may increase quarantine non-compliance. A policy should 
include consultation with public health authorities to seek out solutions to these issues. If 
this situation were to occur during a communicable disease event in the United States, 
members of the public health team would need to take steps to reassure members of the 
community that they were receiving appropriate medical care. 
While the forced quarantine of large number of citizens occurred during both of 
these cases, it is imperative to note that this repressive tactic did not eventually become 
responsible for the cessation of these communicable disease events. In the case involving 
the MERS-CoV outbreak in South Korea, it was determined the forced quarantine of 
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asymptomatic patients was unnecessary because the disease was not spread among 
asymptomatic citizens. During the SARS event in China, the eventual intervention by the 
WHO and the adoption of evidence-based practices stopped the spread of disease, not the 
implementation of forced quarantine. 
Both forced quarantine episodes were ended after consultation with the WHO or 
CDC. The application of evidence-based practices, such as the use of contact tracing in 
China, was responsible for the end of the disease outbreaks. The use of forced quarantine 
was not the inherent reason for the cessation of these events. Forced quarantine of large 
groups of people was not medically necessary. These factors should be considered when 
developing a quarantine enforcement plan in the United States. 
2. Self-quarantine Assessment 
Data was collected from the episodes of self-quarantine that occurred during the 
SARS outbreak in Canada in 2003 and also in Zaire during the 1976 outbreak of Ebola. 
Although these two episodes occurred 27 years apart, they both are examples of how self-
quarantine can be used to stop the spread of disease. Moreover, the use of self-quarantine 
in Canada sheds light on how this public health policy can be effectively implemented 
without relying on law enforcement solely to make arrests for quarantine non-compliance.  
Following discovery of the EVD in a small village in Zaire during 1976, scientists 
from the WHO were sent to Yambuku and examined the citizens and their surroundings. 
As a result, the causative factors of the disease were determined and corrective action was 
taken. Local citizens were instructed not to eat bushmeat that served as a reservoir of the 
disease and healthcare workers were instructed not to re-use hypodermic needles. The self-
quarantine policy was successful, in part, due to the inaccessibility of the small village from 
urban cities in Zaire. While this facet of the episode contributed to its success, it could not 
be replicated or expected in the United States. Even the most rural U.S. town is accessible 
by private or public transportation.  
The Canadian local and federal governments declared a medical emergency due to 
the 2003 SARS epidemic. As a part of this declaration, a self-quarantine was ordered for 
Canadians who might have been exposed to SARS patients. Self-quarantine was not 
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ordered in response to hysteria and panic. As a result, affected citizens were made aware 
of the rationale behind the quarantine orders. In addition, the Canadian government took 
actions to assist with quarantine compliance. For example, unemployment benefit wait 
times were waived, and food, water, and other supplies were provided to citizens who self-
quarantined. These supportive actions encouraged most quarantined citizens to comply, 
which resulted in local law enforcement only having to make arrests as a last resort. The 
supportive actions taken by the government in conjunction with law enforcement making 
arrests as a last resort contributed to the success of this self-quarantine policy. 
3. Hybrid Quarantine Assessment 
The hybrid version of quarantine applied in China during 2003 occurred because of 
a failed forced quarantine policy. The policy changed after consultation with the WHO. 
The WHO recommendation of contact tracing drastically reduced the number of citizens 
who needed to be quarantined. The evidence-based approach introduced by the WHO was 
instrumental in the cessation of the epidemic. Even so, the Chinese government continued 
to censor news media coverage of the event. While the hybrid version of quarantine was a 
success, the freedom of the press is a constitutional protection and censorship of it would 
not be tolerated in the United States.  
The quarantine policy during the EVD event in the United States became a hybrid 
policy due to the many different variations that occurred. While the people living in the 
apartment building with Thomas Duncan were quarantined or investigated in Texas, New 
Jersey only quarantined one nurse who was returning from West Africa. The governor of 
Connecticut took it upon himself to create a quarantine policy that was more restrictive 
than what was suggested by the CDC. These experiences of forced quarantine share 
similarities with the forced quarantine episode that occurred in San Francisco during the 
bubonic plague outbreak of 1900. Back then, overreaching and unnecessary forced 
quarantine orders were implemented in predominantly Chinese neighborhoods. A court 
later overruled the policy because it was not only medically unnecessary, but also 
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discriminatory in nature.210 While the 2018 EVD outbreak was short lived, it is unknown 
if the hybrid quarantine policies adopted actually were instrumental in ending the epidemic.  
The 2019 Ebola outbreak is the latest of many to strike West Africa; this 
communicable disease event has been catastrophic in the DRC. A hybrid quarantine plan 
has been implemented and resources are being directed to the affected citizens and their 
communities. Due to the numerous Ebola outbreaks, longstanding distrust of the DRC 
government coupled with continued infighting amongst rival factions, and many refugees 
flooding into the country, community support of the plan is low. Due to a high level of 
distrust, citizens have resisted the policy. These reactions would have ramifications if such 
a policy were instituted in the United States. Without the support of the quarantined 
citizens, regardless of how effective the hybrid quarantine policy is, success is unlikely.  
E. CONCLUSION 
While forced quarantine has been used to stop the spread of disease, it has not 
successfully resulted in ending a communicable disease event in recent history. An 
examination of the case studies presented in this thesis illustrates the ineffectiveness of 
forced quarantine policies. Warehousing large numbers of people in these cases did not 
stop the spread of disease and fostered mistrust of the government, which resulted in 
citizens not complying with the policies.  
A review of the case involving self-quarantine reveals that this policy has been 
effectively used to stop an epidemic. While the self-quarantine episode that occurred in 
Zaire during 1976 probably could not be replicated today in the United States, the Canadian 
self-quarantine policy has features that could be applied. The keys to the success of the 
Canadian self-quarantine lie in the support provided to affected citizens coupled with the 
evidence-based rationale for implementing self-quarantine. These measures resulted in 
self-quarantine compliance and did not require law enforcement to make an inordinate 
number of arrests. 
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The two hybrid quarantine cases presented in this thesis illustrate the complexities 
of quarantine policies. The hybrid quarantine episode in China during 2003 occurred after 
the country experienced a failed forced quarantine policy. This change in policy occurred 
only after the WHO intervened and persuaded the Chinese government to quarantine 
people only when medically necessary. While the hybrid quarantine policies in the DRC 
may be effective, the longstanding regional conflict along with mistrust of the historically 
corrupt government is impeding the progress of this policy. The distrust of the DRC 
government by its citizens mirrors the distrust many have in U.S. law enforcement. A 
quarantine policy to be enforced by U.S. law enforcement needs to be implemented 
transparently and only be used to stop the spread of disease, without unnecessarily 
interrupting the constitutional rights of citizens. 
The next chapter of this thesis addresses these topics and how they can be applied 
to develop a quarantine enforcement plan in Philadelphia. The implications for public 
health, the local political culture, and the inclusion of the PPD on the public health care 
team are examined. The goal of the next chapter is to review the issues that may affect 
Philadelphians during the next communicable disease event and to provide policy solutions 
to these obstacles. 
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IV. QUARANTINE ENFORCEMENT IN PHILADELPHIA 
This chapter discusses matters the PPD will face while attempting to implement 
quarantine enforcement plans and offers guidance on how to address these issues based 
upon the information learned in the case studies examined in Chapter III. Law enforcement 
may only need to play an ancillary role when enforcing quarantine upon compliant citizens. 
Moreover, the collaboration and cooperation of the PPD with all relevant stakeholders can 
help provide information and services to affected citizens. However, with that said, these 
plans also will have to confront the possibility directly that force may be required to enforce 
quarantine in some cases. This chapter describes how law enforcement should approach 
the role of quarantine enforcement from the least restrictive method to the most restrictive 
method, arrest. Aspects of quarantine enforcement plans addressed in this thesis can be 
used to develop policies that can be implemented by other U.S. law enforcement as well.  
The PDPH plan for the execution of quarantine enforcement is outlined in the IQP. 
Currently, the IQP lists five tasks that the PPD will address during a communicable disease 
event requiring enforcement of quarantine orders. In no particular order of importance, 
they are: 
*Serve and enforce court orders for isolation or quarantine as requested by 
PDPH. 
*Provide an escort for EMS transport of individuals or groups requiring 
transportation for purposes of isolation and quarantine, if needed. 
*Execute arrest warrants related to isolation and quarantine cases, as 
needed. 
*Provide security for those in isolation and quarantine, as needed. 
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While the inclusion of the PPD on the public health team is a constructive beginning, 
additional instruction and guidance needs to be included in the IQP, along with the creation 
of a PPD policy that addresses the responsibilities highlighted by the PDPH in the IQP. 
These changes will have implications on the health of affected citizens and can be used to 
stop the spread of disease in Philadelphia. 
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 
The use of quarantine as a public health tool to stop the spread of disease has proven 
to be effective. Assisting citizens with maintaining quarantine compliance will be one of 
the actions the PPD will undertake during a communicable disease event. The PPD’s 
techniques can influence citizens to make choices that are in the public interest, create 
collaboration between affected stakeholders, and include ways the public health team can 
verify compliance. A quarantine enforcement plan should also include evaluating the needs 
of the quarantined patient. Additionally, a method needs to be developed to address citizens 
who defiantly resist quarantine orders and risk spreading disease to the rest of the 
community.  
B. PPD HISTORY WITH THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
The PPD has a long and unenviable history involving its policing of the African-
American community in Philadelphia. Going as far back as the 1960s, the PPD methods 
used in these communities have come under scrutiny. Frank Rizzo, first as a PPD Police 
Commissioner and then later as the Mayor, often embodied a tough on crime stance that 
polarized the citizens of Philadelphia along racial lines.212 In 2015, Philadelphia civil 
rights attorney Larry Krasner told Jake Blumgart of Vice.com, “Rizzo kidnapped the 
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fucking city, that’s what he really did.”213 Many African-Americans in Philadelphia saw 
the Rizzo-led PPD as a “force of oppression and fear.”214 
On August 28, 1964, the Columbia Avenue Race Riot erupted after two PPD 
officers investigated two African-American citizens who were sitting in a broken down car 
at the corner of 22nd Street and Columbia Avenue. The couple, Odessa and Rush Bradford, 
were intoxicated and embroiled in a domestic dispute when the two PPD officers arrived. 
When the officers tried to intervene, the scene erupted into a riot.215 False rumors spread 
that the officers had beaten Odessa Bradford to death. Community activist Cecil B. Moore 
later found Odessa Bradford alive and well. Moore told reporters from The Philadelphia 
Inquirer that he drove her through the community to show the neighbors that she was 
unharmed.216 Nevertheless, the riot went on for several days as stores were burned and 
looted. Many of the businesses never recovered and still stand vacant today.  
The Frank Rizzo-led PPD continued strategies that centered on the policing of 
African-American communities in Philadelphia. To counter the growing Black Panther 
Party in 1970, PPD officers conducted investigations that included mass arrests and strip 
searches conducted on sidewalks, as depicted in Figure 1.217  
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Figure 1. Photograph of PPD Arrest of Black Panther Party 
Members, 1970.218 
When Frank Rizzo was elected Mayor of Philadelphia in 1972, he still had the PPD at his 
disposal and the methods of policing he used in African-American communities continued. 
In 1978, an African-American activist group called MOVE was entrenched in a West 
Philadelphia neighborhood. It was not long before the PPD intervened. On August 8, 1978, 
PPD officers converged on a home and gunshots rang out. When the event was over, one 
PPD officer had died because of a gunshot wound. MOVE representatives continue to 
insist, however, that Officer James Ramp was killed by friendly fire.219  
By 1985, MOVE had regrouped and was occupying a new compound in West 
Philadelphia. Neighbors reported various issues with the group home, to include children 
not being properly fed, wild animals running loose, proclamations about the group at all 
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hours of the night with a bullhorn, and random gunshots fired into the air.220 On May 13, 
1985, a Pennsylvania State Police helicopter flew over the home and a PPD lieutenant 
dropped a satchel onto the roof to dislodge a fortified bunker. The ensuing explosion caused 
a fire that destroyed several city blocks. Eleven MOVE members, including five children 
perished in the inferno.221 As recently as August 15, 2019, PPD officers conducting a 
narcotics investigation came under siege from a gunman wielding a semi-automatic rifle. 
During the investigation and attempted arrest, six PPD officers were shot. The six officers 
were quickly transported to local hospitals and survived. The 2019 siege eerily resembled 
the 1985 MOVE event, but this time, the PPD had changed its tactics. After waiting several 
hours, the African-American gunman voluntarily surrendered and was not injured.222 
Despite the relative success of the 2019 event, PPD officers were still taunted by members 
of the community.223 
The political culture surrounding how the PPD interacts with the African-American 
community in the city began to show signs of change in 2017. Larry Krasner was elected 
as the District Attorney of Philadelphia in a landslide victory.224 Krasner ran on a 
progressive platform that focuses on the downgrading of crimes and the declination of 
minor crimes that many see as something PPD officers have used to target the African-
American community unfairly for decades. In addition, according to Krasner, his 
“decarceration” policy will stop the unfair prosecution of minority communities by 
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releasing non-violent criminals from local jails.225 The crime of retail theft under $500 
dollars is no longer considered a felony, and instead, the District Attorney’s Office (DAO) 
treats it as a summary offense, punishable by only a fine. Additionally, the DAO no longer 
prosecutes marijuana possession cases with no intent to sell.226 The decision not to 
prosecute minor crimes and the release of non-violent offenders from prison has been met 
favorably by the African-American community in Philadelphia.227 
In light of the history of the PPD and the current environment in the United States 
surrounding the methods police departments utilize to interact with at-risk communities, 
the forcible removal of citizens from their homes may well be perceived as an attack or an 
invasion. This removal will be counterproductive to the public health mission to stop the 
spread of disease. With the PPD history and the racial divide caused by the actions of some 
police officers serving as a backdrop, the construction of a policy to involve U.S. law 
enforcement in a plan to enforce quarantine orders needs to be undertaken with great care 
and consideration.  
1. Influencing Citizens to Maintain Self-quarantine 
Although the PDPH has assigned the quarantine enforcement role to the PPD, this 
role is not clearly defined in the IQP except for a statement that the PPD has the power to 
serve arrest warrants related to quarantine non-compliant citizens. However, the PPD will 
not be able to rely solely on arrest powers to enforce quarantine orders. Since executing 
arrest warrants for people suspected of committing crimes, even violating quarantine 
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orders, can be a dangerous and time-consuming procedure, non-arrest methods that assist 
citizens to maintain quarantine compliance also need to be utilized. 
One useful method for promoting compliance is to create incentives for citizens to 
abide by quarantine orders. Economists claim that incentives can increase compliance with 
policies enacted by governments. Thaler and Sunstein coined a term called “libertarian 
paternalism” that describes actions that governments can take to influence citizens’ choices 
that will be beneficial to them and their community.228 According to Richard H. Thaler 
and Cass R. Sunstein, a person could be nudged to maintain the desired behavior if they 
were provided appropriate rewards.229 Nudging theory has already been used with positive 
results by government agencies. The Behavioral Insights Team (BIT), once a part of the 
British government, is an organization that uses nudges to alter the behavior of a targeted 
audience.230 Luke Ravenscroft of BIT explained to BloombergQuint.com that research has 
demonstrated that people care most about the status of the people who live nearest them. 
When the British government sought to increase the number of citizens paying their taxes 
in a timely manner, BIT nudged citizens by sending letters to tardy taxpayers to notify them 
of the prompt compliance of their neighbors. One of the letters read, “Nine out of ten people 
with a debt like yours, in your area, pay their tax on time. You are in the minority.” British 
citizens who received this letter paid their taxes at a 6% higher rate than those who did not 
receive the letter, which thus accounted for an additional 200 million pounds in taxes 
collected.231 
Law enforcement in the United States is already using nudges to influence public 
safety. The Gainesville (FL) Police Department (GPD) has instituted a vehicle safety 
program that nudges drivers and pedestrians to acknowledge each other. To accomplish the 
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nudge, the GPD has erected large signs near busy highways that document the weekly 
percentage of drivers who yield to pedestrians in crosswalks.232 GPD police officers, along 
with staff from other police departments and local colleges, are used to monitor crosswalks 
near the signs. The goal yield rate is 60 percent. While that goal has not yet been reached, 
the GPD has reported yield rates as high as 52%.233 
The use of nudging strategies could likewise positively influence quarantined 
citizens to maintain compliance and should be considered by any jurisdiction formulating 
a quarantine plan. To nudge citizens into compliance, the quarantine enforcement team can 
notify them about the compliance rate in their neighborhood and inform them about how 
maintaining compliance can help stop the spread of disease and result in a better chance of 
keeping themselves and their families healthy. Providing this information to the affected 
citizens can help them to make choices that maintain compliance with quarantine orders. 
The PDPH, PPD, and other member organizations on the quarantine enforcement team 
should also provide citizens with timely, relevant medical information about the disease 
and the quarantine status. When people are placed in quarantine, they lose the ability to 
make the decisions they routinely make. Nudging theories can assist citizens to make 
educated decisions without overtly compelling them to do so. The use of nudge theories by 
law enforcement can be an effective tool to help maintain quarantine compliance. 
2. Quarantine Enforcement Conducted through Collaboration 
Another important approach to securing citizens’ compliance that should be a part 
of any quarantine plan is a collaborative team that includes the public health department, 
police and fire departments, and other stakeholders who can act to solve public health and 
community issues. In West Philadelphia, violent crime, unemployment and the rate of high 
school dropouts is on the rise. In a program started in the 18th police district, community 
leaders and government officials collaborated to develop a program that would encourage 
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and support citizens at risk of criminal recidivism to return to school to earn a General 
Education Development (GED) certificate.234 This program not only benefits citizens who 
have had prior contact with the judicial system, but also has established a team of 
organizations that can reach out to an at-risk population in the case of a public health 
emergency.  
Such a direct pathway of communication could answer the questions and concerns 
of citizens affected by quarantine enforcement orders, as well as reinforce these citizens’ 
trust through demonstrations of accessibility. The result should lead to higher rates of 
compliance. The inclusion of faith-based and other community organizations can also be 
critical to the communication component of quarantine order enforcement. Using non-
traditional organizations, such as churches, businesses, and schools, can assist in bridging 
the credibility gap the police department has with many at-risk communities.235 The Red 
Cross and Salvation Army have extensive disaster response experience and can assist in 
communicating timely and relevant public health information. For example, when 
Hurricane Ike struck Texas and Louisiana in 2007, the Red Cross used social media 
resources to increase effective communication with the community. By using the website 
Flickr, the Red Cross was able to post pictures of the event as it was occurring. YouTube, 
Facebook, and Twitter were used to urge the public to seek shelter or to volunteer during 
the emergency.236 Creating alternate and duplicate communication pathways to provide 
public health information to citizens affected by a public health emergency could be an 
effective method to increase quarantine order compliance.  
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3. The Use of Surveillance without Unnecessary Intrusion 
While nudging theories and community engagement can assist citizens to maintain 
quarantine compliance, law enforcement will still need to conduct surveillance to ensure 
amenability. When the PPD or other members of the public health team perform 
surveillance, they will need to be mindful that negligence or malfeasance during this phase 
may drive citizens to become non-compliant with quarantine orders. PPD officers 
conducting surveillance will be faced with the daunting task of checking in on citizens who 
have not committed a crime. The surveillance conducted during this phase of the operation 
needs to be keenly focused only on the medical requirements of the quarantine orders. The 
surveillance of citizens’ compliance with quarantine orders also needs to occur without 
unnecessarily intruding on their privacy. Establishing trust between quarantined citizens 
and the enforcement team, including the PPD, will be a crucial goal, as cooperation and 
transparency between quarantined citizens and the PPD may contribute to the success of 
such surveillance operations.  
Surveillance of quarantined citizens can be conducted with the use of already 
existing technology. Telephones, video conferencing, geospatial technology, and ankle 
bracelets can be used to track people’s locations without members of the public health team 
having to be physically present in the same location. The use of cellular telephones, many 
of which include video conferencing functions, has made it particularly easy to 
communicate with people all over the world. During the 2003 SARS epidemics in Canada 
and China, for example, less than one percent of the quarantined citizens monitored by 
phone were found to be non-compliant.237 Computer software was utilized to call hundreds 
of people simultaneously under quarantine orders. If the person did not answer, then further 
investigation was conducted to determine the whereabouts and status of the quarantined 
person.  
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Communication via telephone for quarantine enforcement surveillance may help to 
establish trust between the affected citizens and the designated caller. In a study conducted 
by Covello and his colleagues, four factors were found to be necessary to establish trust 
during crisis communications: “caring and empathy; dedication and commitment; 
competence and expertise; and honesty and openness.”238 Although the PPD has been 
tasked with enforcing quarantine orders, delegating some aspects of this effort may be 
beneficial for relevant stakeholders, as the presence of police officers during quarantine 
enforcement operations, even if limited to the telephone, may cause people to feel as if they 
have committed a crime or are being accused of doing so. The personnel performing 
quarantine surveillance over the telephone need not be members of the police department. 
Only after trust is established with affected citizens can other goals, such as maintaining 
quarantine compliance, be achieved.  
The use of video conferencing can be a method to monitor quarantine enforcement 
compliance successfully, but drawbacks can occur. Video conferencing can be conducted 
via computer or cellular telephones and provides a method for quarantine compliance 
monitoring without the intrusion of allowing another person into the home. However, as in 
the case of telephones, using video conferencing to monitor compliance also requires 
establishing trust between the quarantined person and the members of the surveillance 
team. Just as quarantined citizens being monitored via telephone can become non-
compliant with quarantine orders, people being monitored by video conferencing can leave 
their homes at other times of the day. If monitored citizens initially choose to be non-
compliant, then the level of surveillance will need to be increased. Unnecessary intrusion 
by members of the public health team, especially the police department, can lead to an 
increased level of mistrust and non-compliance with quarantine orders. 
Although ankle monitors can be used for the surveillance of quarantined citizens 
during a communicable disease event, the negative impacts of this method almost always 
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outweigh the advantages. Ankle monitors carry a stigma, as they have been used almost 
exclusively with people who have committed crimes and require supervision, usually 
people under house arrest, or on probation or parole.239 In a study conducted by the U.S. 
Department of Justice, 22 percent of respondents were found to have been fired from their 
jobs because they wore an ankle monitor.240 In addition, the poor quality of the global 
positioning system (GPS) tracking system or internet connection and dead batteries have 
contributed to decreased effectiveness of ankle monitors in California.241 The existing 
technical problems occurring with the use of ankle monitors, coupled with the stigma it 
may cause to at-risk populations, makes the implementation of this technology undesirable.  
The PPD will play a role in the enforcement of quarantine orders by conducting 
physical surveillance of both compliant and non-compliant quarantined persons. In a city 
with a population of approximately 1.5 million people, this surveillance will be a daunting 
responsibility to undertake while also conducting traditional law enforcement duties.242 
Non-law enforcement or non-governmental members of the public health team can be used 
to convince quarantined citizens to remain compliant. The surveillance of compliant people 
affected by quarantined orders can be accomplished through effective communication. As 
seen in the case studies involving the Canadian experience with SARS in 2003, providing 
the public with relevant information can positively affect quarantine compliance. Members 
of the public health team will be required to ensure quarantined people are maintaining 
compliance and it can be a time-consuming operation. If the quarantined person refuses to 
meet with non-governmental members of the public health response team, then their 
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actions should be interpreted as a clear signal of non-compliance and the PPD role should 
change accordingly. If the PPD is going to carry out the physical surveillance of 
quarantined people effectively, creativity and flexibility will be critical to its success. 
4. Assessing the Needs of Quarantined Citizens 
A patient needs assessment of citizens affected by quarantine orders will be 
necessary, as the resulting information may provide data that can be used to modify the 
quarantine enforcement plan to stop the spread of disease more effectively. The patient 
needs assessment should serve not only as a data collection document, but also as an 
opportunity for the quarantine enforcement team to use critical thinking skills that will 
allow the supervisory staff on team to make better policy decisions. As Albanese and 
Paturas explain, critical thinking can also be described as “reasoning skills” that policy 
makers can use to interpret and frame problems and develop conclusions to resolve 
complex issues often found during disaster response.243 The patient needs assessment 
conducted by the quarantine enforcement team will be used to record information that can 
be used to serve the quarantined citizen better and to adjust the quarantine enforcement 
plan, if needed. 
The patient needs assessment should be seen not only as a way to collect data that 
can be used to modify enforcement operations, but also a means to gain compliance of the 
citizen being surveyed. Some citizens may choose to be non-compliant with quarantine 
orders for many reasons, and a patient needs assessment may be used to resolve these 
issues. If, for example, citizens were non-compliant because their utilities (gas, electric, 
water, cable, and/or internet) had been interrupted, a member of the quarantine enforcement 
team at the scene should be able to contact the appropriate provider and attempt to reinstate 
the service. Although contacting the local cable television company to improve customer 
satisfaction is not a traditional law enforcement role, it may be a way for affected citizens 
to maintain some connection to their community during a public health crisis and thus 
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enhance morale and maintain quarantine compliance. Addressing the needs of affected 
citizens could build community support for the quarantine enforcement plan.  
The PPD also should use its resources and networking capabilities (in person or 
through technology) to serve at-risk populations, such as non-English speaking residents, 
the elderly, and homeless citizens to assess what they need to maintain compliance with 
quarantine orders. Completing a patient needs assessment for a single individual can 
provide information about why others are also non-compliant, as well as decrease the need 
for physical force to be used during enforcement operations.  
C. TRANSPORTATION OF QUARANTINED CITIZENS 
The PPD will be required to transport quarantined citizens safely while conducting 
quarantine enforcement operations. The IQP created by the PDPH delegates the 
responsibility to escort quarantined patients to the PPD.244 Although the IQP shifts this 
responsibility to the PPD, it provides no guidance on how it can be safely accomplished. 
The citizens’ physical condition, along with their willingness to comply with quarantine 
orders will need to be assessed prior to escorting them to an appropriate facility. Strategies 
to ensure the security and safe transport of quarantined citizens and the transporting officers 
are addressed in this chapter.  
Although the PDPH has assigned the PPD the role of quarantine enforcement, it 
offers no guidance concerning the appropriate transportation of non-compliant quarantined 
citizens. Philadelphia Fire Department (PFD) personnel routinely transport sick and injured 
people via ambulance. Although this practice is expected to continue during a 
communicable disease event, the IQP provides no guidance concerning this issue. The 
ambulances used by the PFD frequently transport injured and sick Philadelphians to local 
hospitals, even if they have been placed under arrest.245 This practice should continue and 
the requirement should be communicated not only to the PFD, but also to the ambulance 
services of local hospitals and surrounding communities. PPD officers can escort 
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ambulances containing quarantined patients to local hospitals using PPD vehicles, as well 
as defer this task to other local law enforcement agencies, if necessary. 
Patients who are both in a non-infectious state and compliant with quarantine orders 
can be transported by PPD officers; however, the decision to use PPD vehicles for 
transportation should be communicated to the quarantined person prior to the event. Sharp 
and Johnson’s study about trust and local police identified at-risk communities as 
“seedbeds for distrust” of law enforcement.246 While the PPD needs to determine what 
type of police vehicle meets the operational needs of quarantine enforcement, this critical 
evaluation also needs to consider that the type of vehicle used can stigmatize the affected 
citizen and the community. Transportation of quarantined citizens in unmarked PPD 
vehicles can diminish the potential false appearance of citizens being placed under arrest 
and removed from their communities. Negative perceptions of law enforcement can 
destroy the spirit of cooperation required to carry out a quarantine enforcement plan 
successfully, particularly escort operations. The factors that will influence the escort of 
quarantined citizens by law enforcement need to be assessed during the planning stages 
and incorporate additional agencies that can also fulfill this role. 
The escort of both compliant and non-compliant quarantined citizens will be 
dictated by the circumstances surrounding the encounter with the quarantine enforcement 
team and the citizens’ medical condition. Additionally, precautions will need to be taken 
when transporting citizens being arrested. Although it can be expected that most compliant 
citizens will accept transportation in an appropriate vehicle, the same cannot be expected 
of non-compliant citizens. Precautions should be taken to ensure that quarantined citizens 
are not injured during quarantine enforcement operations, including patient escorts. PPD 
budget availability along with a memorandum of understanding (MOU) should be 
evaluated to determine if some of the financial and operational responsibility can be shifted 
from the PPD. Sharing this increased responsibility can facilitate undisrupted law 
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enforcement operations by all affected agencies during a timeframe when the continuance 
of operations will be strained.  
To make the transportation of quarantined citizens as non-confrontational as 
possible, prior contact with the citizens will be necessary. Prior communication with the 
affected citizens can be an opportunity to gain compliance or assuage any fears they may 
have. By informing the quarantined citizens about the rationale behind the actions that will 
be taken, PPD officers can give them adequate time to prepare for transportation. Taking 
these steps prior to the transportation of quarantined citizens can alleviate some of the stress 
and anxiety that may lead to further non-compliance and prevent possible hostile 
interactions with the police.  
D. PLACING CITIZENS UNDER ARREST FOR QUARANTINE ORDER 
VIOLATIONS 
Encouraging citizens to be compliant with quarantine orders should be one of the 
main goals to be achieved during a communicable disease event. However, not all citizens 
will be compliant and a plan for non-compliance needs to be created as well. Law 
enforcement organizations communicate with citizens and community organizations as a 
part of daily operations. These networking capabilities should be used to increase 
awareness of a disease event, transmit public health information to the public, and receive 
updated medical data from citizens for reciprocal reports to the public health department. 
Existing communication networks and the building of new alliances can be used to enforce 
quarantine, even amongst non-compliant citizens. 
The enactment of quarantine orders may be necessary to stop the spread of disease, 
but a balance between maintaining individual rights and preserving the needs of the public 
must be met. The least restrictive means possible to enforce quarantine and serve 
quarantine related orders should be utilized. In the landmark case of Washington v. 
Milwaukee, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin weighed the risk of preserving an individual’s 
rights against the need to protect the community against the spread of infectious 
tuberculosis. The plaintiff in this case, Ruby Washington, had tested positive for infectious 
tuberculosis, was offered free medical care, and a non-punitive location was agreed upon 
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where she could serve her quarantine period. Despite these accommodations, Ruby 
Washington was determined to be non-compliant with this agreement. In finding for the 
City of Milwaukee, the courts determined the circumstances presented in the case would 
permit the arrest and forced quarantine to be the least restrictive means necessary.247 
Affected citizens will still have due process rights and these orders must be carried out in 
the least restrictive manner to maintain the public health of the community. According to 
the non-profit organization, Trust for America’s Health, “nearly 9 out of 10 Americans say 
they would abide by a voluntary quarantine and stay home” and the 10 percent that 
indicated they would not comply indicated they were concerned they would lose their jobs 
or income.248 It is imperative for law enforcement to protect the delicate balance between 
the rights of citizens and the duty to protect the community while they enforce quarantine 
orders.  
1. Implications Surrounding the Arrest of Non-compliant Quarantined 
Citizens 
The arrest of non-compliant quarantined citizens during a communicable disease 
event is likely to be a law enforcement operation that poses a high risk to all involved 
parties. Citizens are currently living in an era in which law enforcement is viewed with 
great distrust across demographic groups throughout the United States.249 The PPD has 
been the subject of negative scrutiny concerning their tactics to search and detain 
citizens.250 The investigatory PPD policy called “stop & frisk” has resulted in many 
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lawsuits.251 Despite constant monitoring and documentation of all PPD vehicle and 
pedestrian investigations, numerous allegations of misconduct have been made, as well as 
a number of related lawsuits filed.252  
Despite attempts to encourage citizens to maintain quarantine compliance, 
situations will inevitably arise that will require the PPD to arrest those who are not 
compliant with quarantine. The taking into custody of non-compliant quarantined citizens 
by the PPD must comply with the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and all 
applicable state and city laws. To prevent an unreasonable search and seizure during a 
public health crisis, the courts have mandated that any actions taken be “reasonably related 
to the public health objective.”253 In case of the use of detention in public health matters, 
the courts have ruled that the examination and temporary detainment of individuals is 
permitted so long as it is not a punishment and it is necessary to stop the spread of 
disease.254 The suspension of civil rights and the policies dictating the proper methods of 
arrest cannot occur due to a communicable disease event where quarantine orders need to 
be enforced.  
Law enforcement officers from the PPD have not been required to arrest individuals 
for non-compliance with quarantine orders in recent history. In cases when such action is 
required, the PDPH is responsible for obtaining an arrest warrant for communicable disease 
patients who have been non-compliant with quarantine orders. Once personnel from the 
PDPH have obtained the arrest warrant, law enforcement officers from the PPD can 
execute the warrant. While the PDPH does not provide guidance for how the PPD will 
place communicable disease patients who are non-compliant with quarantine under arrest, 
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past experience, training, and current policies can provide sufficient information to carry 
out this task. 
2. The Use of Arrest and Search Warrants during Quarantine 
Enforcement 
The utilization of arrest warrants needs to be addressed prior to the implementation 
of the quarantine plan. One of the goals listed by the PDPH in the IQP is for the PPD to 
“execute arrest warrants related to isolation and quarantine cases, as needed.”255 The PPD 
will be called upon to execute arrest warrants for non-compliant quarantined citizens. The 
IQP does not provide specific guidance for serving arrest warrants for non-compliant 
quarantined citizens. The IQP also does not address other issues pertaining to the issuance 
of arrest warrants, such as the need to serve search warrants as well. 
Maintaining and documenting due diligence for possibly hundreds of people 
simultaneously will be a logistical obstacle that a quarantine enforcement plan must 
address. According to the PPD arrest warrant policy, sworn personnel will exercise due 
diligence when attempting to serve arrest warrants. Due diligence is described as “frequent 
and thorough attempts to apprehend a defendant named in an arrest warrant.”256 Arrest 
warrants in Pennsylvania have a 180-day limit. Failure to exercise and properly document 
due diligence results in the expiration of the arrest warrant; however, sworn PPD officers 
who obtain an arrest warrant and properly document due diligence are exempt from the 
180-day rule. Nonetheless, if a communicable disease event lasts for several weeks or 
months, the number of non-compliant quarantined citizens will invariably rise. 
The IQP will need to be adjusted to authorize PPD officers to execute and serve 
search warrants on non-compliant quarantined citizens if deemed to be necessary. Whereas 
the IQP authorizes the PPD to execute arrest warrants for quarantined citizens, the use of 
search warrants during quarantine enforcement will also pose unique challenges, as the 
IQP does not currently authorize officers to obtain and serve search warrants. The non-
compliant citizens who are the subject of arrest warrants may not be present at their 
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residence during the execution of the arrest warrant. As mandated by the Supreme Court 
and directed by PPD regulations, sworn personnel who are executing arrest warrants on 
individuals located in residences other than their own will also be required to obtain a 
search warrant that authorizes them to enter the premises for the purpose of effectuating 
the arrest.257  
The creation of a quarantine enforcement plan will need to incorporate the arrest 
and search warrant policies already in use. Another challenge related to search warrants 
concerns when they will be served. According to the pertinent directive, search warrants 
obtained by PPD officers are to be served between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. Nighttime 
searches are permitted; however, the PPD officer applying for the search warrant must 
notate the exigent need to serve the search warrant during this timeframe on the warrant 
application.258 The same procedure will need to be followed if PPD officers are serving 
search and arrest warrants for citizens in violation of quarantine orders.  
Additional issues could inhibit the use of search warrants during quarantine 
enforcement operations. As noted earlier, arrest warrants obtained by PPD officers can be 
utilized indefinitely if due diligence is maintained and documented during the process; 
however, search warrants obtained in Pennsylvania must be served within two days from 
the date of issuance.259 Although due diligence documentation for search warrants is not 
necessary under the directive, this practice should be adopted to satisfy future judicial 
expectations and expedite the process of reapplying for subsequent search warrants. 
The utilization of search warrants along with arrest warrants when the targeted 
citizen is suspected of a crime occurs frequently during narcotics investigations. Once law 
enforcement has developed enough evidence reasonably to believe that narcotics are being 
stored or manufactured, search and arrest warrants are served at the most opportune time, 
i.e., when both the evidence and suspects can be taken into custody. In all likelihood, a 
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most opportune time to arrest a quarantine non-compliant citizen will not exist. Whereas 
people manufacturing or storing illegal narcotics are closely linked to the location where 
the narcotics are, the non-compliant quarantine citizen has no such ties. Currently, all 
citizens wanted for violating a quarantine order would have to do to avoid arrest would be 
to stay in locations other than their residences and move periodically. If such actions are 
multiplied by the thousands of non-compliant people with quarantine orders, then the 
effective enforcement of quarantine orders by PPD is thus rendered virtually impossible. 
The inclusion of the use of search warrants in the IQP could improve this situation. 
3. Maintaining the Security of Quarantined Citizens 
Regardless of the law enforcement function being performed, police officers are 
responsible for the safety of the citizens in their custody. As such, police officers will be 
required to ensure the security of citizens during quarantine enforcement operations that 
result in an arrest. The methods needed to maintain the security of non-compliant citizens 
placed under arrest should resemble current PPD policy concerning the guarding of 
hospitalized prisoners. Under that policy, a prisoner is denied the ability to use the 
telephone and only immediate family members are permitted to have supervised visits.260 
Although this PPD directive can provide guidance in the early stages of security operations 
involving a non-compliant quarantined patient taken into PPD custody, this policy will not 
be effective if the citizens need to spend an elongated time at the hospital. Under the current 
policy, PPD officers must guard hospitalized prisoners until they make bail or the charges 
are dropped. If the prisoners are not granted or cannot post bail, then responsibility for their 
custody shifts to the Philadelphia Prison System (PPS).261 Prisoners under medical care, 
though, are transported to jail only once they are discharged from the hospital. Adhering 
to this policy for weeks at a time could deplete PPD manpower and decrease operational 
capabilities. 
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4. Use of Force Considerations during Quarantine Enforcement 
The issues facing PPD officers attempting to enforce quarantine orders also include 
the appropriate amount of force that will be required to accomplish the task. PPD officers 
are guided by policies that dictate the appropriate amount of force to be used: according  
to PPD Directive 10.2, “Use of Moderate/Limited Force,” officers may only use the 
minimum amount of force needed to overcome the immediate threat or to place a person 
under arrest.262 The Use of Force Decision Chart in Directive 10.2 stresses that PPD 
officers will not use force if the subject is compliant with commands; however, they can 
progressively apply more force as the situation escalates. The rationale for using deadly 
force is described at the top of the chart depicted in Figure 2. According to PPD Directive 
10.2, “deadly force is authorized when the officer has objectively reasonable belief that 
they must protect themselves or another person from the immediate threat of death or 
serious bodily injury.”263  
 
Figure 2. PPD Use of Force Decision Chart.264 
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It can be expected that at least some non-compliant quarantine citizens will attempt 
to elude capture, and some may even use violence to avoid being placed under arrest; 
however, the enforcement of quarantine orders and the proper amount of force to be used 
by police officers during such encounters is not mentioned in any PPD directive. While the 
PPD has been assigned the task of enforcing quarantine orders, it would be a tragedy for 
both the department and the citizens of Philadelphia if such encounters turned deadly. Thus, 
it is critical that specific protocols be developed to guide the use of force in such situations. 
Quarantine policies must reflect the use of the least restrictive means necessary to maintain 
public safety while balancing the protected constitutional rights of the impacted citizens. 
In Washington vs. Milwaukee, the courts ruled that all reasonable attempts to gain 
compliance must be tried before a quarantine is imposed and the manner and place of 
quarantine must be the least restrictive necessary to accomplish the medical goal.265 This 
requirement must be considered when formulating and enacting quarantine orders upon the 
citizens of Philadelphia. 
The next chapter of this thesis discusses recommendations to include the creation 
of a PPD policy designed to address quarantine enforcement specifically. These 
recommendations also include the identification of needed revisions to the existing IQP. 
Additionally, the importance of fostering and developing collaboration and communication 
amongst the organizations conducting quarantine order enforcement is also recommended. 
These recommendations represent an initial step towards better addressing the next 
communicable disease event in Philadelphia. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. DISCUSSION  
The PDPH has tasked the PPD to enforce quarantine orders if a communicable 
disease event occurs in the city. While the PDPH has delegated the enforcement task to the 
PPD, the IQP authored by the PDPH offers very little guidance concerning how 
enforcement of these orders will take place.  
The recommendations presented in this thesis can contribute to the creation of an 
effective plan for law enforcement to enforce quarantine orders during a communicable 
disease event. The circumstances surrounding the onset of an epidemic will vary. However, 
it is imperative if police officers are delegated the enormous responsibility to enforce 
quarantine orders that a plan must be developed to include all the relevant stakeholders.  
The literature presented in this thesis validates the use of quarantine to stop the 
spread of disease and law enforcement will play a role in its implementation. Besides taking 
on the task of enforcing quarantine orders, the PPD will still be required to carry out 
traditional law enforcement tasks. A quarantine enforcement plan developed for U.S. law 
enforcement will need to be carried out while police departments also continue to maintain 
operational readiness. 
The issues of everyday life will not stop when quarantine enforcement becomes a 
reality; the recommendations provided in this thesis are a starting point to develop a plan 
to diminish the impact of communicable diseases on the citizens in U.S. communities. The 
recommendations presented can be used to formulate a quarantine plan that can be 
implemented by U.S. law enforcement in general, and the PPD, in particular.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Recommendation #1—The PPD quarantine enforcement plan should be 
implemented using the least restrictive means necessary.  
The PPD should create a quarantine plan that will provide affected citizens with a 
reasonable opportunity to comply with public health orders. In Washington vs. Milwaukee, 
100 
a four-step test was created to ensure a quarantine order gives the affected citizen a 
reasonable opportunity to comply before the order is enforced. Once all other feasible 
options are exhausted, the quarantined citizen should be taken into custody and taken to a 
local jail for treatment. A review of the case studies in this thesis concerning the use of 
forced quarantine show a markedly lower rate of success than that of policies that take into 
account the application of using the least restrictive means necessary. The PPD quarantine 
plan should incorporate a similar test to provide citizens a reasonable chance to comply 
without law enforcement involvement.  
A challenge facing the PPD will concern how citizens are forcibly quarantined after 
they become non-compliant. While the PPD has existing policies concerning the use of 
force that may be used against citizens, no such instruction exists for the use of force police 
officers may use during quarantine enforcement operations. PPD use of force policies will 
need to be reviewed to address this unfortunate possibility.  
Since quarantine enforcement has not been necessary in Philadelphia in over 100 
years, training is needed for PPD officers to teach them how to enforce quarantine orders 
using the least restrictive means. In addition, both PPD officers and command staff should 
meet with members of the community to explain how quarantine orders will be carried out. 
The PPD currently has community outreach programs that can be used to provide this 
training for citizens and officers.  
• Recommendation #2—Ancillary support of quarantined citizens can foster 
additional compliance. 
To support compliance with quarantine orders further, procedures should be 
adopted to assist citizens with basic needs. The Canadian government took actions to assist 
with quarantine compliance by waiving unemployment benefit wait times, and delivering 
food, water, and other supplies to quarantined citizens. The literature review presented in 
this thesis indicates quarantined citizens are more likely to comply if their basic needs are 
met.  
Logistical obstacles will be faced if basic necessities need to be delivered to 
affected quarantined citizens. Members of the public health care team, to include the PPD, 
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PDPH, PFD, volunteer citizens, and other stakeholders, will need to be trained to deliver 
these goods safely. Tabletop and live training opportunities are presented by the PDPH 
throughout the year; incorporating basic needs delivery methods into these exercises will 
allow the members of this public health team to find and resolve potential pitfalls before a 
communicable disease event occurs in Philadelphia. 
The quarantine enforcement plan should include the assessment of the needs of 
those impacted and the delivery of basic necessities to them. This assessment by members 
of the public health team, including the PPD, can foster cooperation with the community 
during a stressful event.  
• Recommendation #3—Providing the community with accurate and timely 
medical information can allay fears and promote quarantine compliance. 
Once Canadian authorities determined a SARS outbreak had occurred, a medical 
emergency was declared. This medical emergency declaration informed the community 
about the disease and why citizens needed to self-quarantine. The research conducted for 
this thesis suggests that providing this information to affected citizens can decrease the 
stress and fear that will occur during an epidemic. During the 2003 SARS outbreak in the 
People’s Republic of China, in contrast, information was intentionally withheld from the 
public. While the government withheld information, Chinese citizens attempted to fill the 
information void by communicating at times inaccurate information about SARS to one 
another privately through texts and phone calls. This communication breakdown generated 
by government authorities further lead to distrust affecting Chinese citizens and played a 
role in increasing the length of the outbreak.  
The release of both daily and time sensitive medical information to the public 
should occur via TV, radio, and the internet. This practice can help dispel rumors and 
incorrect information. The release of all incorrect medical information, as shared by 
Donald Trump during the 2014 Ebola outbreak, likely cannot be prevented. However, 
public health departments must continue to counterbalance this dissemination of incorrect 
information by being a trusted source that citizens can turn to during a communicable 
disease event. Sharing pertinent information about the public health emergency can ensure 
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the quarantine enforcement plan is carried out transparently and foster additional 
compliance.  
The PPD and PDPH both maintain a strong social media presence in Philadelphia. 
Besides providing the community with accurate and timely medical information through 
traditional news media outlets, the PPD and PDPH should utilize their already existing 
social media accounts to provide this information. While the PDPH will continue to be the 
department to provide sound information concerning the disease outbreak, the PPD needs 
to be the lead agency for quarantine enforcement issues. These potential problems can be 
resolved by establishing clear interagency pathways between each agency’s public 
information departments.  
• Recommendation #4—Foster collaboration with the quarantine 
enforcement plan by addressing issues with citizens residing in at-risk 
communities. 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the PPD and citizens of at-risk communities have a 
long history of mutual distrust. Spanning as far back as the Columbia Avenue riots of 1964, 
many African-American Philadelphians have had a negative view of the PPD. The PPD 
should take this opportunity to collaborate with all relevant stakeholders, especially 
members of the African-American community, when developing a quarantine enforcement 
plan.  
Collaboration between the PPD, other members of the public health care team, and 
citizens in the community should be developed to create a quarantine enforcement plan 
before a communicable disease event occurs. The PPD should ensure citizens are kept 
informed about these plans and reassured that the goal will be to use the least restrictive 
means necessary. Meetings can increase citizen engagement in this process. Additionally, 
this plan can be posted on the already existing PPD internet site and reviewed as the need 
arises.  
To increase transparency of quarantine enforcement operations further, 
representatives from all the participating municipal organizations, to include the PDPH and 
PFD, along with the PPD, should maintain a presence at community meetings. Presenting 
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representatives from all the relevant agencies at these meetings can increase the legitimacy 
of quarantine enforcement operations by showing the public that a collective team effort 
working alongside citizens in the community can work together to maintain quarantine 
conditions safely during a crisis.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Quarantine is a method that has been successfully used in the past to stop the spread 
of communicable diseases. The enforcement of quarantine will cause people to be 
separated from family, friends, and co-workers, and this separation should not be taken 
lightly. The creation of a quarantine enforcement plan involving U.S. law enforcement can 
accomplish several goals. The plan can help protect citizens from getting sick, prevent 
unnecessary restriction of protected constitutional rights, and foster collaboration that can 
lead to the success of the plan. Addressing these needs prior to a communicable disease 
event, and not after it has begun, is vital to the success of the plan. 
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